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ABSTRACT 
In the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, a reported 12,000 
volunteers arrived to help.  Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, an estimated 
30,000 volunteers converged on ground zero and the Pentagon.  As the weather 
cleared following Hurricane Katrina, over 60,000 volunteers descended upon 
Louisiana, Alabama, Texas, and Mississippi to offer assistance.  These well-
intentioned citizens were both a blessing and a curse.  While offering assistance, 
they also snarled key roads, distracted first responders who were worried about 
their safety, and created massive accountability and administrative headaches.   
To address the problem of volunteer convergence at disaster sites, some 
locales have developed their own unique volunteer in-processing systems, 
commonly referred to as volunteer reception or volunteer mobilization centers.  
These systems are developed independently, do not always tie into disaster 
plans, and are not standardized across the nation.   
America lacks a national plan for integrating these volunteers and 
currently has no mechanism for ensuring their credentials across the nation. A 
national volunteer certification card and database system is needed to better 
utilize America’s most valuable asset, her people, during times of crisis. 
Empowering and documenting the skills average citizens already possess are 
the keys to proactively managing volunteers and assigning them where needed.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
I must say that I have seen Americans make a great deal of real 
sacrifices to the public welfare; and have noticed a hundred 
instances in which they hardly ever failed to lend a faithful support 
to one another.1 
Alexis de Tocqueville 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Americans are willing to volunteer.  Unfortunately, they offer assistance 
more during times of great calamity and crisis.  The exponential increase in civic 
involvement during these times is accompanied by mismanagement, waste and 
underutilization of volunteers because America lacks a standardized mechanism 
to deal with the influx.  The Oklahoma City bombing, 9/11, and Hurricane Katrina 
events have provided clear examples of ways in which volunteer utilization has 
been ineffective.   
The problem has multiple parts.  First, as with many issues that cross both 
state and federal boundaries, there are coordination issues created by the 
Constitutional division of powers.  These lead to duplication of effort and lack of 
standardization among volunteers.  As the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution states, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”2   In this regard, the Tenth Amendment is often 
cited as the justification for individual states to develop their own policies and 
procedures for volunteer management, which may or may not fit into larger 
federal emergency response plans.  The problem with such devolution of power 
 
 
1 Alexis de Tocqueville, text of the Tocqueville Society History as listed on the Web page at:  
http://liveunited.org/Tocqueville/history.cfm (accessed 8/18/2009). 
2 Text of the Bill of Rights as listed on the "Bill of Rights Transcript," on the U.S. Government 
Web site at: http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/bill_of_rights_transcript.html (accessed 
5/15/2009). 
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is that as our nation has become more and more interconnected, multiple 
systems of regulation—or no system of regulation—complicate the effective 
utilization of volunteers.  
In times of crisis volunteers cross state lines, sometimes traveling great 
distances to assist in the hardest hit areas.  Because volunteers are regulated at 
the state level, however, there is no standardized volunteer certification program 
in the United States.  While there is an argument to be made that too much 
standardization and requirements of conformity run against many core American 
ideals, there are two reasons why it is appropriate in the case of volunteer 
management at disaster sites.  They are safety and efficiency.  First, there is the 
issue of volunteer safety.  The Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) is charged with setting and enforcing work safety standards across the 
entire United States.3  Cognitively then, it makes sense to standardize certain 
aspects of volunteerism for the same reasons.  Second, as previous disasters 
have shown, the lack of uniformity in volunteer management has resulted in less 
efficient utilization of volunteers.  The link between efficiency and standardization 
has been well documented in commercial industry and is equally applicable in 
this case.4  
The realm of volunteer management is large, and therefore requires 
specific analysis of areas that could most benefit from standardization. Three 
brief examples highlight potential spheres in which standardization might be 
beneficial.  They are volunteer credentialing, proper documentation of skill sets 
not associated with volunteer organizations, and finally, acceptance of volunteer 
skills as depicted on certifications lacking identity components (e.g., photographs 
and computer chips).  
 
3 Information regarding the mission of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration as 
found on the OSHA Web site at: 
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owasrch.search_form?p_doc_type=STANDARDS&p_toc_level
=0&p_keyvalue= (accessed on 10/28/2009). 
4 Paul S. Nadler, "Being Different Only When It Counts," Bankers Monthly,  
September 1, 1992, 8. 
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One area that could benefit from a more uniformed approach revolves 
around volunteer qualifications or credentialing.  Currently, members of 
established volunteer organizations receive numerous unique forms of 
certification that are different than other organizations.  This increases confusion 
as volunteer managers are forced to interpret different formats as they attempt to 
best place volunteers in areas where they can be of the most use. 
Another area involves addressing those citizens who are not members of 
established volunteer organizations at all, but still possess skills that are highly 
relevant at a disaster site.  These volunteers experience frustration and 
mismanagement because there is no standardized way of documenting their 
abilities.  Professional craftsmen and tradesmen are one example of potential 
volunteers with skills, but ones that are not normally documented from 
established disaster volunteer organizations.  These skills could include 
plumbing, electrical, transportation, and childcare.  As well-intentioned citizens 
proceed to disaster sites, there is a litany of questions that must be addressed.  
How do these citizens prove their skills or certifications?  Must they carry 
licenses, diplomas, etc to prove they have the requisite skills needed?  Will the 
local authorities recognize certifications from outside states?    
Even if the documentation is recognized, will these volunteers be allowed 
access just for having the skills, or must they be requested?  As the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS) Credentialing Guidelines from the 
Department of Homeland Security propose, only those volunteers who are 
requested (during emergencies) should be admitted.5  In essence, if states follow 
the suggested federal guidelines, qualified volunteers with skill sets who drove 
for many hours to help could be turned around and sent home.  This might 
possibly lead to violence, a decline in charitable work, or political fallout. 
 
5 "National Incident Management System Guideline for the Credentialing of Personnel” as 
listed on the Federal Emergency Management Agency Web site at: 
http://www.fema.gov/good_guidance/download/10280. (accessed 5/17/2009). 
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Third, there is the question of certifying the credentials of volunteers from 
organizations such as the American Red Cross, Salvation Army, or Civil Air 
Patrol whose identification cards lack photographs and can easily be fabricated 
by both well intentioned citizens and criminals alike.  Each of these organizations 
has its own distinct and unique membership cards and forms of certifications.  
Even if local authorities accept volunteer cards lacking photos, they must still sift 
through the nearly “240 variants of state identification cards and over 7,000 
different types of birth certificates” to ensure legitimacy.6  
The very question of establishing identity of volunteers is also 
controversial because of fears relating to intrusions of privacy and state 
monitoring.  Many volunteer organizations do not have photographic identification 
cards for this reason.  A recent issue involving the American Red Cross 
demonstrates how emotionally primed the topic can be of requiring volunteers to 
submit information that they perceive as “private.”  Recently the American Red 
Cross starting requiring criminal background checks on its volunteers because 
some of its workers had been caught stealing donated funds.7  The requirement 
caused much controversy and even resulted in some members electing to quit 
the Red Cross in lieu of submitting to the background check.   
Despite this opposition, volunteer identity is a major issue and one that 
must be resolved prior to allowing anyone into a disaster area.  Permitting access 
to unqualified volunteers can produce negative results, as previously described.  
Perhaps more importantly, however, not registering volunteers and certifying 
their identities as legitimate can create problems should any casualties or 
accidents occur at the volunteer site.  For example, one volunteer nurse at the 
Murray Federal building in Oklahoma City was killed when she tried to reach a 
 
6 Brian Grow, "Licenses to Kill for Terrorists, Getting Fake ID is Simple and Cheap," Business 
Week, no. 3831 (5/5/2003), 71. 
7 Stephanie Strom, “Red Cross Sifting Internal Charges Over Katrina Aid,” The New York 
Times (Mar, 2006). 
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trapped victim and parts of the roof fell on her.8  If this volunteer did not have an 
identification card on her at the time of the accident, it would have greatly 
complicated the next of kin notification process.  Clearly, volunteers must have 
some form of identity card to assist the authorities if such an accident occurs 
again.   
As the example of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City shows, 
there is a requirement for volunteers to have identity cards in case of an 
accident.  Further, there is also the need to have identity cards issued ahead of 
time to ensure they meet entrance requirements dictated by the law.  
Identification cards are required by law for anyone before entering crime scenes, 
so there is already a precedent for such procedures.   
Because the Federal Building [In Oklahoma City] was officially 
declared a crime scene immediately after the attack, according to 
law, everyone entering the building had to be approved and had to 
possess verifying identification.  Issuing identification to the doctors, 
volunteers, insurance adjusters, and others who wanted access to 
the building delayed rescue operations and made it difficult for 
police to protect the perimeter of the building.9 
As the three preceding topics have shown, the issue of volunteers working 
at disaster sites is a complicated one.  While it is absolutely essential to have 
volunteers working to alleviate damage, they are both a blessing and a curse.  
America’s lack of a standardized mechanism for managing these volunteers has 
resulted in many locales developing their own response to the problem.    
To manage the massive influx of new volunteers during disasters, some 
communities have developed Volunteer Mobilization Centers (VMCs) and 
Volunteer Reception Centers (VRCs).   Many municipalities have recognized a 
need to sort through the certification and identification problems associated with 
 
8 Richard C. Larson, Michael D. Metzger, and Michael F. Cahn, "Responding to 
Emergencies: Lessons Learned and the Need for Analysis." Interfaces 36, no. 6 (Nov/Dec, 2006): 
486. 
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the influx of volunteers by creating these centers.  Two such centers exist in 
Frederick County, Maryland, and Fairfax, Virginia.  According to the Volunteer 
Frederick Web site, a mobilization center “Is a center where spontaneous, 
unaffiliated volunteers offering help would be interviewed, registered and 
assigned to emergency/disaster related volunteer duties requested by agencies 
in Frederick County.”10  The organizers of Frederick County have already 
learned the lessons of “thousands of spontaneous, unaffiliated volunteers 
appearing in Manhattan alone.”11  They have pre-designated five mobilization 
centers, all of them church buildings, to be used in the event of a future disaster.  
Local citizens are made aware of the centers and can access additional 
information about them on the organization’s Web site.  However, volunteers 
responding to a disaster from outside of the local area may be unaware of the 
centers, their locations and local policies.  These centers certainly address some 
of the lessons learned for dealing with volunteers, but much more is needed. 
B. HYPOTHESIS 
Because there is no standardized volunteer management system in the 
United States, volunteers responding to disasters have been mismanaged, 
underutilized and many of their skills have been wasted.  While managing the 
influx of volunteers at disaster sites is a recognized problem, the United States 
still has not implemented a standardized, nation-wide plan to address the 
problem before the next disaster strikes.  Current efforts at all levels of 
government to address volunteer management fail when tested against the case 
studies of Oklahoma City, 9/11, and Hurricane Katrina.  Specifically, at the local 
 
 
9 Richard C. Larson, Michael D. Metzger, and Michael F. Cahn, "Responding to 
Emergencies: Lessons Learned and the Need for Analysis." Interfaces 36, no. 6 (Nov/Dec, 2006): 
486. 
10 "Volunteer Mobilization Centers," as listed on the Volunteer Fairfax Web site at: 
http://www.volunteerfrederick.org/volunteer_mobil_center.html (accessed 4/25/2009). 
11 "Volunteer Mobilization Centers," as listed on the Volunteer Fairfax Web site at: 
http://www.volunteerfrederick.org/volunteer_mobil_center.html (accessed 4/25/2009). 
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and state level, the volunteer mobilization center construct fails to solve many of 
the problems historically highlighted.  At the federal level, the Department of 
Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency are still 
focused on first responders and largely neglect volunteer management issues.   
C. SIGNIFICANCE 
During disasters volunteers are increasingly showing up in larger and 
larger numbers to help.  Sociologists call this the phenomenon of convergence.12  
Human resource planners call it spontaneous, unaffiliated volunteers.13  
Whatever the name, it is a well documented problem and one that has yet to be 
fully addressed.  If and when another major disaster occurs, the same problems 
of the past will occur again unless changes are made at the national level.  While 
Americans love and hold sacred the idea of individual state’s rights, this thesis 
will argue it is time to develop a comprehensive plan to ensure that our nation’s 
most valuable resources, its people, are used most effectively and efficiently to 
serve the people in need.   
In 1985, Stallings and Quarantelli identified five historically documented 
types of volunteer convergence.14  In the aftermath of Oklahoma City, 9/11, and 
Katrina, analysis of these types spurred state and local officials to develop 
mechanisms for volunteer management.  Two of the most recent inventions to  
help mitigate the problem of convergence are volunteer mobilizations centers 
and volunteer reception centers.  These efforts have broken considerable ground 
in addressing spontaneous volunteers, but they are only part of the solution.   
 
12 Lauren S. Fernandez, Joseph A. Barbera, and Johan R. van Dorp, “Strategies for 
Managing Volunteers during Incident Response: A Systems Approach,” Homeland Security 
Affairs  II , 3 (Oct, 2006). 
13 “Managing Spontaneous Volunteers in Times of Disaster: The Synergy of Structure and 
Good Intentions,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, Washington DC, as listed at: 
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/disasterhousing/ManagingSpontaneousVolunteers.pdf 
(accessed 5/29/2009). 
14 Robert A. Stallings and E. L. Quarantelli, "Emergent Citizens Groups and Emergency 
Management," Public Administration Review 45 (Jan, 1985), 93. 
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This thesis will propose one way to enact a national system, through the use of a 
national volunteer database and certification card.  The creation of a national 
volunteer database and a national volunteer certification card could solve many 
of the basic problems associated with volunteer convergence by providing a 
proactive tool for organization and management before the crisis occurs. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis asserts the creation of a national volunteer database and 
national volunteer certification card, when augmented with current management 
efforts like the volunteer mobilization/reception centers, would greatly increase 
volunteer management success during times of crisis.  Current efforts to alleviate 
convergence problems, such as volunteer mobilization centers, will be compared 
with the proposed solution to show strengths and weaknesses of each. Next, the 
proposed solution will be tested against the historical examples of Oklahoma 
City, the 9/ 11 attacks, and Hurricane Katrina.  The case studies will be examined 
to determine the scope of the problem and the specific nuances associated with 
the mass turnout of volunteers in times of national crisis.  The proposed solution 
of creating a national volunteer certification card and database will be 
hypothetically applied to these scenarios to show how they could have corrected 
many of the documented problems of each disaster.  Finally, an analysis of the 
results will be used to create a tailored plan to create synergistic solutions to the 
mass turnout problem.  
Once the problem has been clearly established, a detailed examination of 
the further problems that have resulted from inappropriate or undocumented 
utilization of volunteers will be addressed.  Such issues as credentialing, 
identification cards, health concerns, safety, long term impacts and even feelings 
of underutilization will be discussed.  A limited analysis of some current efforts to 
increase utilization through volunteer mobilization centers, and mechanisms to 




Following this introductory chapter, Chapter II begins with a baseline 
definition of convergence.  It also includes a description of the categories of 
volunteers assembling at disaster sites and their potential motivations for 
involvement.  Chapter III details the current structures used for responding to 
disasters and crisis in the United States.  It begins with a systematic approach 
from the federal level and then proceeds to examine subsequent levels from the 
state down to the city and local levels.  It also provides a brief explanation of the 
five federally sponsored Citizen Corps volunteer programs.  Chapter IV examines 
the topic of national identity cards and looks into the notion of a volunteer 
certification/identity card combination as applied to volunteer management.  The 
chapter takes an in-depth look and analysis of the REAL ID Act of 2005 and 
other federal legislations aimed at establishing identity.   Chapter V begins with 
this thesis’s argument for a national volunteer database and certification cards.  
The proposed solution will then be used as a guide in a retrospective analysis of 
three disasters and their reported lessons learned to test the applicability of a 
national volunteer database and volunteer certification card.  Chapter VI 
concludes with an overall summary of the problem and proposed solutions.  It 
details four recommendations that are needed to realize the benefits of a national 
volunteer database.  
 10
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. CONVERGENCE DEFINED 
The problems of managing volunteers after disasters are widely 
recognized.  Those who work with the volunteer community and disaster 
response have summarized these issues under the term “convergence,” a term 
that refers to the sets of issues created when volunteers rush in large numbers to 
a disaster scene.  As the California Volunteer Management Office describes, 
“Convergence behavior is well documented: the ‘first responders’ are very often 
civilians, who begin search and rescue operations and provide first aid before 
firefighters, emergency medical services personnel and other responders arrive 
on the scene.”15  Yet, according to the same office and other volunteer 
management experts, this is where the problem begins, and instead of rushing 
out to help, well-intentioned citizens should instead remain at home.  By assisting 
their immediate families and neighbors with non-emergent situations, volunteers 
can relieve the pressure from first responders.  This is the major focus behind the 
Department of Homeland Security’s civilian preparedness web site entitled 
“Ready.Gov” and others, such as the American Red Cross Preparedness 
Campaign.  
The University of Delaware Disaster Research Center conducted a study 
in 2001, which concluded the best way to manage volunteers showing up at 
disaster sites was to try and get them pre-registered before the disaster and 
assigned to affiliated volunteer groups such as the American Red Cross.  This 
idea appears to be directly linked with current efforts to pre-register potential 
volunteers through such efforts as Citizen Corps and Ready.Gov.  The report 
also noted, however, how politicized volunteering has become and how hard it is 
to tell volunteers “no” and to send them away once they have arrived at the 
 
15 California Volunteer Management Office, available at the Web site at:   
http://www.californiavolunteers.org/index.php (accessed 4/25/2009). 
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disaster site.16  Elected officials, who professional first responders work for, are 
eager to be seen as proactive in disasters and would naturally shy away from 
any actions that might negatively portray them as not helping.  Yet this is exactly 
what the federal government suggests in the newly released National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) Credentialing Guidelines.  There is an obvious 
disconnect between the “ground truth” of those who have learned from previous 
disasters that volunteers will show up and the new policies advocated by the 
federal government to send them away.  This apparent disconnect in policy will 
be further examined later, but is still important to mention here as it shows how 
misunderstood volunteer convergence still is. 
B. UNAFFILIATED VOLUNTEERS 
The issues associated with convergence are largely linked to unaffiliated 
volunteers.  These volunteers are citizens who feel the need to help during times 
of disaster, and who simply show up without being members of volunteer 
organizations.  They often lack any formal training related to disaster response.  
There are volunteer organizations specializing in disasters, but most converging 
volunteers are not members.  The National Volunteer Organizations Active in 
Disasters (NVOAD) is a forum of affiliated volunteer agencies that attempts to 
streamline volunteer efforts into governmental plans.  It has put forward the idea 
of forming volunteer reception centers to deal with those “unaffiliated volunteers” 
who will inevitably show up.  As part of the NVOAD proposed solution, the 
volunteer reception centers will provide spontaneous volunteers with a “Go 
Kit.”17   The kit is designed to get volunteers in-processed and quickly assigned 
 
16 James M. Kendra and Tricia Wachtendorf, “Rebel Food…Renegade Supplies: 
Convergence After the World Trade Center Attack,” University of Delaware, Disaster Research 
Center, December 2004, as found at: 
http://dspace.udel.edu:8080/dspace/bitstream/19716/708/3/PP%20316.pdf  (accessed 
5/29/2009). 
17 “Managing Spontaneous Volunteers in Times of Disaster: The Synergy of Structure and 
Good Intentions,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The Federal Emergency Management 




                                           
to relevant tasks commensurate with the individual’s skill sets.  While good in 
theory, part of the “Go” process involves preparing and providing volunteers with 
identification cards.  While the concept of identity cards is appropriate and 
required, as evidenced in Oklahoma City and 9/11, the controversy of identity 
cards is not addressed and assumed to be non-existent. 
Identity cards have proven to be highly controversial, with critics asking 
questions that include, what types of information will be contained on them, and 
how will they be used?   While the NIMS Credentialing Guidelines do address 
volunteer cards, the suggestions are simply that, suggestions.  There is no 
federal requirement for a volunteer identity card.  Therefore, the issue of 
standardization must also be addressed and it is not by the NVOAD “Go” plan.   
C. MEDICAL CERTIFICATIONS 
Another problem demonstrated by the three cases of Oklahoma City, 9/11 
and Hurricane Katrina is the issue of certifications for volunteer medical 
personnel.  The Medical Reserve Corps of the United States government 
recognizes that medical volunteers may also converge on a disaster site, but 
offers no way of integrating them into the relief efforts.  On its Web site, it states, 
“Medical professionals must understand their skills may not be utilized if they do 
not affiliate with a volunteer group prior to an emergency.”18  In essence, the 
government has again stated that unless you are a volunteer with an established 
organization before a disaster occurs, do not bother showing up at the disaster 
site to help.  This policy completely disregards the lessons learned from all 
previous disasters in which volunteers will arrive whether they are asked for, 
affiliated or not.   
 




                                           
D. LEAD FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES 
Because of the widespread devastation and the perceived lack of a timely 
response, mainly during Hurricane Katrina, some advocates have suggested that 
even when assisted by volunteers, the Department of Homeland Security and 
FEMA are not capable of addressing the problems associated with such 
widespread damage.  They suggest, as noted by Kathleen Gereski in the 
October 2006 issue of the Journal of Homeland Security Affairs, that the U.S. 
military instead should be the lead agency.19  This has created much 
controversy, as it entails constitutional as well as ethical questions.  While her 
article did not advocate the U.S. military should assume the lead duties currently 
held by DHS and FEMA, it did show how frustrated ordinary citizens and some 
governmental officials still are when it comes to addressing disasters.  One of the 
main arguments in favor of the military is that it is rapidly deployable, has a clear 
chain of command, is uniformed and credentialed and varied enough to perform 
such functions as security, medical, public works and transportation.  
States and local municipalities have also realized the problems of 
volunteer convergence and have developed their own solutions.  While the 
development of individual state systems is entirely appropriate and legal, it has 
not necessarily resulted in a framework designed to optimize volunteer efficiency, 
nor standardized their safety.  As noted in chapter one, one recent state concept 
to better manage volunteers is the volunteer mobilization center or volunteer 
reception center.   
Frederick County in Maryland and Fairfax County in Virginia have 
established two such centers and have begun to integrate them into state 
disaster plans.  Other states—California for example—have created new state-
wide volunteer management departments.  If another major disaster strikes, it is 
 
19 Kathleen J. Gereski, “The Department of Defense as Lead Federal Agency.” Homeland 
Security Affairs II, no. 3 (Oct, 2006). 
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currently unknown whether these individual efforts will prove helpful or further 
increase the chaos associated with spontaneous volunteers.     
These unilateral efforts are not coordinated above the local or township 
level in most cases.  Further compounding the problem is that few states have 
coordinated on volunteer management issues.  In contrast, state governments 
have increased coordination of first responders across county lines and have 
developed mutual assistance agreements known as Emergency Management 
Assistance Compacts (EMACs). While not perfect, the EMAC system allows for 
coordinated interaction between various state agencies prior to, during and after 
disasters and attacks.  A similar system does not exist for coordination or 
categorization of volunteers.   
E. VOLUNTEER MANAGEMENT   
There is a difference of opinion between volunteer organizers on the best 
way to integrate volunteers in the aftermath of a disaster.  The concept of the 
volunteer mobilization center is to rapidly streamline volunteers and assign them 
duties where needed, with a secondary function of aligning volunteer skill sets 
with specific problems.  Others argue that skill matching is essential and that 
volunteers should be screened before placement in any relief effort.  Dr. Michita 
Champathes Rodsutti, managing director of the Management Psychology 
Institute in Thailand, recommended a very structured system for volunteer 
processing after witnessing the problems of volunteer convergence following the 
2004 tsunami in Thailand.  Her recommendations included using proven human 
resource management techniques, to include screening and providing 
handbooks of what to expect before volunteers are allowed to assist.  She also 
argues that, contrary to the NIMS credentialing guidelines, a volunteer who has 
traveled a great distance to assist should not be turned away.20   
 
20 Michita Champathes Rodsutti and Piyarat Makayathorn, "Organizational Diagnostic 
Factors in Family Business: Case Studies in Thailand," Development and Learning in 
Organizations 19, no. 2 (2005), 16. 
 16
                                           
Dr. Rodsutti’s comment about not turning away a volunteer and the need 
to provide psychological training hint at the often forgotten mental health 
challenges associated with volunteering at disasters.  In a 2008 article in The 
Gerontologist, Windsor, Anstey and Rodgers attempt to tackle the question of 
how much is too much in regards to volunteering.  The study, conducted in 
Australia, attempted to assess the “nonlinear association of volunteering and well 
being.”21  The concept that too much volunteering can be detrimental or that it 
can have psychological influences does not appear to be a consideration in our 
local efforts at volunteer organization at disaster sites.  While adult volunteers are 
assumed to be rational thinking human beings, recent medical studies have 
started to show a negative psychological impact of volunteering too much.  Dr. 
Tim Windsor, of Australian National University, recently published a report in 
which he found that “Those who volunteer for more than 15 hours a week… 
showed lower levels of mental health and well being.”22    Currently, there is no 
system tracking volunteer work in the United States that could illuminate whether 
this is a potential problem.  Likewise, there is currently no way of knowing how 
much time a volunteer may have devoted at a disaster site. 
In conclusion, Americans have shown a willingness to volunteer since our 
nation’s inception.  Unfortunately, as the cases of Oklahoma City, 9/11, and 
Hurricane Katrina will show, we still lack a credible mechanism for managing the 
influx of volunteers showing up to help after a disaster occurs.  While some 
states have started pilot programs, such as the mobilization centers and 
governor level cabinet offices, the results are not standardized and not integrated 
across the nation.  There are debates related to credentialing, identity cards and 
screening.  Likewise, there is documented proof of the psychological impacts 
associated with disaster work, but no attempt is currently being made to provide 
 
21 Timothy D. Windsor, Kaarin J. Anstey and Bryan Rodgers, "Volunteering and 
Psychological Well-being among Young-Old Adults: How Much is Too Much?" The Gerontologist, 
vol 48, no. 1 (Feb, 2008), 5. 
22  Dr. Tim Windsor, “Too Much Volunteering Unhealthy,” as listed on the Science Alert Web 
site at: http://www.sciencealert.com.au/news/20080810-18260-2.html (accessed on 10/28/2009). 
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pre-emptive psychological advice and standardized post-work care.  As major 
disasters have shown, volunteers will arrive from across the country.  Yet, having 
local or state only procedures, both lacking in standardization, will only increase 
inefficiencies and add to the problem.  Federal responses to the volunteer 
question have been limited to recommendations from FEMA and loose 
associations for credentialing, such as those found in the NIMS Credentialing 
Guidelines.  While the problem is widely recognized, no solution has yet been 
offered that provides a realistic, coordinated method of integrating local, state, 
federal and non-governmental entities.   
 18
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III. CURRENT DISASTER RESPONSE STRUCTURE 
A. AMERICA’S EMERGENCY RESPONSE STRUCTURE 
The United States, like all industrial nations, has a complex structure in 
place to mitigate the devastation and suffering of its citizens in the event of attack 
or disaster.  Each successive level of government has a specific function and has 
developed certain procedures to manage crises, but none are designed to handle 
the massive influx of spontaneous, unaffiliated volunteers that have historically 
arrived after each major disaster.  First, a cursory examination of the current 
structures and organizations used within the United States at the national level 
will help to show how the current system is organized and where responsibilities 
lay.  The next section will examine several of the major volunteer organizations in 
the United States, as well as several smaller initiatives underway at the state and 
local level to process volunteers who are not affiliated with any of the major 
organizations. Finally, an analysis of three organizations specializing in 
spontaneous, unaffiliated volunteer processing will be conducted.  This analysis 
demonstrates that some incremental progress in the management and 
processing of converging volunteers is being made, but more work is needed. 
B. NATIONAL RESPONSE STRUCTURE AND APPROACHES 
In the event of another Hurricane Katrina or 9/11 type attack, the national 
response begins with the federal government.  The federal government stands 
ready to react, primarily through a presidential disaster declaration.  The 
government has developed a series of national approaches, institutions and 
structures to help mitigate some of the damage caused during major 





                                           
The development of a new National Response Plan (NRP) to align 
Federal coordination structures, capabilities, and resources into a 
unified, all discipline, and all-hazards approach to domestic incident 
management.23    
In December 2004, the United States Department of Homeland Security 
produced the National Response Plan (NRP).  It, along with the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) (discussed in more detail below), provided the first 
all hazards approach to national emergencies.  The development of both 
documents was not only national in scope, but also applicable to all levels of 
government and jurisdictions.24  Updated in 2006, the NRP was ultimately 
superseded by the National Response Framework (NRF) in January 2008.  The 
NRP was replaced by the NRF to “better align the document with its intent and to 
encourage the continued development and refinement of detailed, robust all-
hazards emergency operations plans.”25    
The NRF is a complex document.  It consists of the core NRF and 
additional annexes.  Directly related to this paper and the topic of volunteer 
convergence is the Emergency Support Function (ESF) Annex.  This annex 
provides a listing of federal resources and capabilities, arranged into functional 
areas “that are most frequently needed in a natural response.”26  The ESF 
structure is designed to be implemented in times of national crisis and will be run 
by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), through one of its 




23 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, Washington, DC: Office 
of the Secretary of Homeland Security, December 2004,i. 
24 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quick Reference Guide For The National 
Response Plan, Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Homeland Security, May 2006. 
25 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework: Frequently Asked 
Questions, Washington, DC,1.  
26 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, Washington, DC: Office 
of the Secretary of Homeland Security, December 2004,4.  
as the ESF center point for the federal response during emergencies.  These 
would also serve as the hub connecting state and local governments to the 
federal emergency system. 
 
Figure 1.   FEMA Regional Offices27 
Table 1 shows all 15 of the ESF Annex functional areas.  It also depicts 
the lead federal entity responsible for each ESF.  
ESF # Title ESF Coordinator 
1 Transportation Dept. of Transportation 
2 Communications DHS (National Communication System) 
3 Public Works & Engineering DoD (US Army Corps of Engineers) 
4 Firefighting Dept. of Agriculture (US Forest Service) 
5 Emergency Management DHS (Federal Emergency Management Agency) 
6 Mass care and housing DHS (Federal Emergency Management Agency) 
7 Logistics and Resources General Service Administration and DHS 
8 Public Health and Medical Dept. of Health and Human Services 
9 Search and Rescue DHS (Federal Emergency Management Agency) 
10 Oil and HAZMAT Environmental Protection Agency 
11 Agriculture & Nat. Resources Dept. of Agriculture 
12 Energy Dept. of Energy 
13 Public Safety & Security Dept. of Justice 
14 Long Term Comm. Recovery DHS (Federal Emergency Management Agency) 
15 External Affairs DHS 
Table 1.   Emergency Support Function Annex Summary 
                                            
27 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, Washington, DC: Office 
of the Secretary of Homeland Security, December 2004,61. 
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It is important to note that some of the ESF functions can be delegated to 
other agencies and organizations.  Of importance, directly related to this thesis, 
the Department of Homeland Security, through FEMA, delegated the primary 
duties for ESF #6 (Mass care and housing) to the American Red Cross.28  This 
is the only nongovernmental organization directly tasked in national response 
planning.29 
To understand how the ESF Annex is used during a disaster, consider this 
real-world event.  In August 2009, a fire broke out in the Santa Cruz Mountains in 
California.  Local and state fire officials immediately began fighting the fire.  At 
some point, the resources of the state were exhausted while fighting the blaze.  
Once this happened, the governor of California requested federal assistance 
through the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.  
This law is the essential tool used for states to formally request federal 
assistance.  The Stafford Act: 
Provides an orderly and continuing means of assistance by the 
Federal Government to State and local governments in carrying out 
their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage which 
result from disasters.30 
In the case of this fire, California resides in FEMA Region IX (see figure 
1), with the Regional Office located in Oakland, California.  Upon request from 
the governor, personnel at this office assigned to ESF #4, the fire functional area, 
began working the federal response to the crisis.  This support included 
assistance from the U.S. Forest Service, and perhaps other ESF lead agencies.  
If for example, the fire would have destroyed hundreds of homes, ESF #6 (Mass 
 
 
28 William L. Waugh, JR., “Terrorism, Homeland Security and the National Emergency 
Management Network,” Public Organization Review 3, no. 4 (Dec, 2003):373-385. 
29 William L. Waugh, JR., “Terrorism, Homeland Security and the National Emergency 
Management Network,” Public Organization Review 3, no. 4 (Dec, 2003):375. 
30 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, DC: June 2007,1. 
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Care and Housing) and #14 (Long Term Community Recovery) could also have 
been involved.  This event shows how the ESF structure provides a tailored 
federal response to emergencies.31   
The National Incident Management System (NIMS) is the other key 
component of the federal plan to mitigate disasters and emergencies.  It 
complements the NRF and vice-a-versa.  The NIMS creation was also directed 
by President George W. Bush under HSPD-5.  The NIMS:  
Provides a consistent nationwide template to enable Federal, State, 
tribal, and local governments, nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), and the private sector to work together to prevent, protect 
against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of 
incidents, regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity.32 
One of the key components of NIMS is the Incident Command System 
(ICS).  It details 14 essential features applicable for federal, state, local, non-
governmental organizations and volunteers.  Some of the key features of the ICS 
include a goal for standardization, the recommendation for a common lexicon of 
terms used throughout the disaster response community, and command and 
control relationships.33 The NIMS design incorporates best practices from across 
the country.   
Finally, before moving into a discussion of the state and local structures 
for dealing with emergencies, it is important to understand how the federal 
government has organized partnerships and provided sponsorship for volunteer 
organizations, designed to be helpful in disaster situations.  Witnessing the same 
massive outpouring of support that de Tocqueville described in 1840, the Bush 
administration was inspired to act following the tragic events of 9/11.  In 2002 it 
 
31 Coincidentally, a series of California fires in the 1970s spurred the development of the 
Incident Command System (ICS). 
32 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System, 
Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Homeland Security, December 2008,i. 
33 “Incident Command System,” Federal Emergency Management Agency: ICS Resource 
Center, available at: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/ICSResource/assets/reviewMaterials.pdf 
(accessed 8/14/2009). 
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created the USA Freedom Corps.  The idea behind it was to create “A new 
volunteerism initiative unprecedented in terms of its potential impact on public 
volunteerism.”34  USA Freedom Corps was the baseline organization creating 
Citizen Corps, which directly involves volunteer programs with disaster 
response.35   
Assigned under FEMA, Citizen Corps was designed “to bring together 
government and community leaders to involve citizens in all-hazards emergency 
preparedness.”36  To accomplish the goal of citizen preparedness and to ensure 
trained volunteer cadre were ready for the next disaster, Citizen Corps was 
structured into five national programs.  Table 2 lists the five federally sponsored 
programs as described on the Citizen Corps Web site.37 
 
34 Jeffrey L Brudney, and Beth Gazley, "The USA Freedom Corps and the role of the 
states," Spectrum, vol. 75, no. 4 (Oct, 2002): 34-38. 
35 These organizations have a very different mission from the similarly-named Americorps.  
AmeriCorps was created in 1993 under President Clinton and encouraged Americans to 
volunteer across the board for various jobs in their local communities.  It is part of the Corporation 
for National and Community Service.  It differs from USA Freedom Corps and Citizen Corps in 
that it is not exclusively focused on emergency management types of volunteerism.  . 
36 Citizen Corps Web site at: http://www.citizencorps.gov/. (accessed 11/2/2009). 
37 “Programs and Partners,” as discussed on the Citizen Corps Web site at: 





Response Team (CERT) 
As of November 2009: 3382 Councils 
Educates people about disaster preparedness and 
trains them in basic disaster response skills, such as 
fire safety, light search and rescue, and disaster 
medical operations. The program is administered by 
DHS. 
The Fire Corps 
As of November 2009: 933 Councils 
Promotes the use of citizen advocates to enhance the 
capacity of resource-constrained fire and rescue 
departments at all levels: volunteer, combination, and 
career. Fire Corps provides resources to assist fire 
and rescue departments in creating opportunities for 
citizen advocates and promotes citizen participation. 
Fire Corps is funded through DHS and is managed 
and implemented through a partnership between the 
National Volunteer Fire Council, the International 
Association of Fire Fighters, and the International 
Association of Fire Chiefs. 
USAonWatch-Neighborhood 
Watch 
Works to provide information, training and resources 
to citizens and law enforcement agencies throughout 
the country. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, 
Neighborhood Watch programs have expanded 
beyond their traditional crime prevention role to help 
neighborhoods focus on disaster preparedness, 
emergency response and terrorism awareness. 
USAonWatch-Neighborhood Watch is administered by 
the National Sheriffs' Association in partnership with 
the Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of 
Justice. 
The Medical Reserve Corps 
Program 
As of November 2009: 825 Councils 
Strengthens communities by helping medical, public 
health and other volunteers offer their expertise 
throughout the year as well as during local 
emergencies and other times of community need. The 
MRC program is administered by HHS. 
Volunteers in Police Service 
As of November 2009: 1928 Councils 
Works to enhance the capacity of state and local law 
enforcement to utilize volunteers. Funded by DOJ, 
VIPS is managed and implemented by the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police. 
Table 2.   Citizen Corps Funded Programs38 
These federally sponsored organizations are spread throughout the United 
States.  As of November 2009, Citizen Corps consisted of 2,422 Councils, with 
the potential impact of serving or interacting with 226,946,309 people (79% of the 
                                            
38 “Programs and Partners,” on the Citizen Corps Web site at: http://www.citizencorps.gov/. 
(accessed 8/15/2009). 
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total U.S. population).39   While these programs offer an excellent reserve force 
for first responders, their structure, training requirements and specialization do 
not address the question of spontaneous, unaffiliated volunteers arriving at 
disaster sites. 
C. STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE STRUCTURES 
State and local emergency response plans are varied. A full assessment 
of these plans is beyond the scope of this thesis, but a short discussion of some 
of the more common structures is appropriate.  Each state has its own 
emergency management system and structure.  Some of these structures and 
plans are designed to tie into federal, other states, and local emergency plans.  
Florida, for example, has developed a Comprehensive Emergency Management 
Plan with its own set of 17 ESFs.  These ESFs are different from the 15 national 
ESFs described in the National Response Framework Annex.   
Most states have developed their emergency plans in compliance with the 
format described in the Incident Command System (ICS).  In California, for 
example, the Governor has created the Office of Emergency Services (OES) to 
oversee all facets of the state’s emergency responses.  Under the OES, there is 
a 24-hour, 365-day a year warning center.  The California State Warning Center, 
located east of Sacramento in Mather, California, is the hub for all statewide 
emergency and disaster events.  The California OES is divided into three 
administrative regions, Inland (Sacramento), Coastal (Oakland) and Southern 
(Los Alamitos).  Charged with coordinating information and resources, each 
regional headquarters is the link between the state and region.  They also serve 
“as a conduit for local and regional perspectives.”40 
 
39 Citizen Corps Web site at: http://www.citizencorps.gov/. (accessed 8/15/2009). 
 





                                           
Each state has developed its own unique and tailored disaster plan.  
These plans are tested and evaluated through real-world events and exercises, 
as well as being integrated into federal plans.  In many cases, the federal 
government requires specific provisions of state plans in order to receive federal 
assistance funding. 
As previously discussed in Chapter II, the EMAC construct allows for 
state-to-state cooperation.  EMACs have been around since 1996 and include 
such services as fire fighting and public utilities support.  An example of an 
EMAC is operation would be a power crew from one state, crossing into another 
state to help restore power.  While not perfect, the EMAC system allows for 
coordinated interaction between various state agencies prior to, during and after 
disasters and attacks. Consider the following example from Hurricane Katrina. 
“On September 8, 2005 an EMAC broadcast message from Governors Blanco of 
Louisiana and Warner of Virginia directed responders not to self-deploy during 
the Katrina disaster.”41  In this example, the governors wanted first responders to 
carefully coordinate their efforts before heading to the disaster area.  
There have been some attempts at coordinating volunteer responses, but 
they have not been standardized.  For example, during the 2004 hurricane 
season, Volunteer Florida and the Florida Association of Volunteer Centers 
successfully used a volunteer hotline and database to inform registered 
volunteers from outside of the state to not self deploy.42  This approach was 
successful in contacting pre-registered volunteers, but would not have helped in 




41 William L. Waugh Jr, "Mechanisms for Collaboration: EMAC and Katrina," Public Manager, 
vol. 35, no. 4 (Winter, 2006), 14. 
42 “Unaffiliated Volunteer Management: Florida’s Record Breaking 2004 Hurricane Season,” 




                                           
had not registered.  Volunteers not part of any such system during Hurricane 
Katrina continued to pack their cars and head to the disaster sites in large 
numbers.   
D. LOCAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE STRUCTURES 
Disasters and emergencies happen at the local level.  It is because of this 
fact that the federal planning for an emergency operates on the premise that 
disaster response is foremost a local operation.43  Designed around a Local or 
township level emergency management office, local structures are often quite 
different from each other, but frequently mirror the structure of the state. Each 
locality, township, or borough has tailored its own plans based on what its 
available resources are, its perceived threats, and other planning factors.   
Continuing with the previous example of California, consider the town of 
Monterey, located about 2 hours south of San Francisco.  It is located on the 
coast and, according to California’s Office of Emergency Management is 
therefore located in the Region of the California Coastal Office of Emergency 
Services.  Within this state structure, it is further subdivided into the Monterey 
County Office of Emergency Services, headquartered in the town of Salinas, 
California, about 15 miles away.  This brief example shows how a local 
emergency management structure can be organized and tied into a larger state 
structure.   
E. VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS ACTIVE IN DISASTERS  
Before discussing the main thesis topic of instantaneous, nonaffiliated 
volunteers, it is important to understand that many volunteer organizations are 
already structured and trained to respond in emergency situations.  In addition to 
the five federally sponsored response organizations mentioned above, there are 
“over 50 national organizations, and hundreds more at state and local levels, 
 
43 Brudney, J., and B. Gazley, “Planning to be Prepared: An Empirical Examination of the 
Role of Voluntary Organizations in County Government Emergency Planning,” Public 
Performance & Management Review, vol. 32, no. 3 (Mar, 2009): 374. 
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comprising a level of response known as Voluntary Organizations Active in 
Disasters (VOADs).”44  At the national level, organizations such as the United 
Way of America, the Salvation Army, and Save the Children are members (for 
complete lists of all National VOADs, as of November 2009, see Appendix B.). 
At the state level and below there are similar organizations grouped under 
the collective heading of Organizations Active in Disasters (OADs).  In California, 
for example, Governor Schwarzenegger signed Executive Order S-04-06, 
charging the state office, California Volunteers, to manage programs and 
initiatives aimed at increasing the number of Californians engaged in service and 
volunteering.45  This office has created the California Volunteers Disaster Corps, 
which, along with the Disaster Service Worker Volunteer Program (DSWVP), 
manages the involvement of specific volunteer organizations active in disasters 
in California.  Most states have similar structures and their primary goal is to 
streamline volunteer activities, providing a structured approach when disasters 
occur.  These structures, along with the five federally sponsored programs, are 
designed for affiliated volunteers only.   
Many states and local communities, recognizing the problem of 
convergence of unaffiliated volunteers, have responded by developing volunteer 
check-in sites, known as volunteer mobilization or reception centers.  Volunteer 
Florida, Volunteer Fairfax (in the National Capital Region) and Volunteer 
Frederick (in Maryland) are three examples of organizations creating these types 
of centers. 
A volunteer mobilization center (VMC) or volunteer reception center (VRC) 
is designed to handle incoming, non-affiliated, volunteers who show up to help 
during times of need.  These centers are all different and can be found at both 
permanent facilities and temporary locations.  For example, in Frederick County, 
 
44 Brudney, J., and B. Gazley, “Planning to be Prepared: An Empirical Examination of the 
Role of Voluntary Organizations in County Government Emergency Planning,” Public 
Performance & Management Review, vol. 32, no. 3 (Mar, 2009): 374. 
45 California Volunteers Web site at: 
http://www.californiavolunteers.org/index.php/About_Us/. (accessed on 15 August 2009). 
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Maryland, there are five pre-designated VMCs.  These centers are all located at 
church buildings and are widely publicized.  In contrast, Volunteer Fairfax does 
not disclose to the public the locations of VRCs for fear of the locations being 
saturated with people before the VRC staff can arrive.  In some cases, the plan 
for having a center is emphasized over the physical location of it.  For example, 
according to a report from Volunteer Florida regarding the location of VRCs 
during the 2004 hurricane season, “it would have been preferable to operate from 
pre-determined, familiar sites, but we recognized that post-storm circumstances 
would dictate the locations.”46  Regardless of their physical location, VMCs and 
VRCs process volunteers to complete registration forms and other administrative 
requirements.  One goal of VMCs and VRCs is to prevent a drain on first 
responders that volunteers sometimes cause.    
Volunteer centers are designed to screen volunteers and then direct them 
to the agency most in need of their specific skills sets and certifications.  At 
Volunteer Fairfax, potential volunteers are asked to fill out a two-page registration 
form (attached at Appendix C) to help determine where they can be of the most 
use.  The form requires basic identity information, emergency contact data, and 
previous volunteer experience.  The form also contains nine categorization 
blocks to help determine the certifications of the prospective volunteers.  These 
categorizations include skills in medical, communications, language, office 
support, services, structural, transportation, labor and equipment.  Confirming the 
certifications and skills of the volunteers is a challenging endeavor for the staffs 
at the VMCs and VRCs. 
Research conducted on how certifications were verified at the VMCs and 




46 “Unaffiliated Volunteer Management: Florida’s Record Breaking 2004 Hurricane Season,” 




                                           
requesting agency—the agency where the volunteer will eventually work—to 
ensure credentialing.47  According to an official at Volunteer Frederick, in many 
cases-  
We simply do not have the time or ability to fully screen volunteers 
being processed at the VMC.  It is the responsibility of the agency 
we are sending volunteers out to, to do additional screening or 
credentialing.  For example, some of our agencies working with 
youth require background checks.  We will not be able to do this at 
the VMC.  In terms of other skills such as training from the Red 
Cross, at the VMC, we will take the volunteer’s word for it.48 
In addition to establishing certifications, the volunteer centers must also 
determine the validity of identity credentials.  As will be discussed in more detail 
in the next chapter, this is a difficult task.  Regarding the idea of identity cards 
and volunteers, the different volunteer centers had varying opinions of how to 
process them on their respective Web sites. 
Volunteer Florida relies upon the VRCs to ensure all volunteers possess 
some form of identity card.49  In Florida during the 2004 hurricane season, many 
volunteers used hospital bracelets as a form of identity card.50  At Volunteer 
Frederick, the VMCs have an identity card checklist (see Appendix D).  The 
Frederick VMCs will turn volunteers away for not meeting the identification 
requirements listed in the checklist.   
Now that the basic structures of the volunteer centers have been 
discussed, along with some of the administrative processes conducted at each, it 
 
47 Official at Volunteer Fairfax, e-mail correspondence from 2 September 2009. 
48 Official at Volunteer Frederick, e-mail correspondence from 13 August 2009. 
49 “Unaffiliated Volunteer Management: Florida’s Record Breaking 2004 Hurricane Season,” 
on the Volunteer Florida Web site at: 
http://www.volunteerflorida.org/emergencymanagement/docs/2008/2004season.pdf, (accessed 
on 9/2/2009). 
50 “Unaffiliated Volunteer Management: Florida’s Record Breaking 2004 Hurricane Season,” 





                                           
is worth examining three organizations (Florida, Frederick and Fairfax) in a more 
detail to show how they are aligned and structured. 
Volunteer Florida was established in 1993 and entered into Florida law in 
1994 “as the Florida Commission on Community Service.”51  Volunteer Florida is 
one of the oldest and most experienced organizations dealing with spontaneous, 
unaffiliated volunteers.  Of direct relevance to this thesis, it produced a report in 
2008 detailing the results of spontaneous, unaffiliated volunteers responding 
during the 2004 hurricane season. Entitled “Unaffiliated Volunteer Management: 
Florida’s Record Breaking 2004 Hurricane Season,” the report details the results 
of a survey conducted of personnel staffing volunteer reception centers (VRCs) 
during this time.  According to one VRC respondent, a universal volunteer 
registration card suitable for both disasters and non-disasters was needed to 
help streamline the processing.  The respondent went on to say that under 
his/her desired system, “a volunteer would register with one state-wide entity and 
[would then] receive a photo identification card listing personal information and 
relevant skill sets.”52 In response to this observation, the report recommended, 
“a system that allows a volunteer to print their registration form and hand carry it 
to the VRC should be created.”5
In Maryland, Volunteer Frederick is designed around a similar construct to 
train volunteers and provide viable solutions to first responders.  It is also tasked 
with processing unaffiliated volunteers through VMCs.  At the VMC all of the 
potential volunteers are registered in the Volunteer and Medical Reserve 
 
51 “Unaffiliated Volunteer Management: Florida’s Record Breaking 2004 Hurricane Season,” 
on the Volunteer Florida Web site at: 
http://www.volunteerflorida.org/emergencymanagement/docs/2008/2004season.pdf, (accessed 
9/2/2009). 
52 “Unaffiliated Volunteer Management: Florida’s Record Breaking 2004 Hurricane Season,” 
on the Volunteer Florida Web site at: 
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9/2/2009). 
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Corps.54  The Medical Reserve Corps, as previously noted in Table 2, is one of 
five federally sponsored volunteer response organizations.  All volunteers 
registering with Volunteer Frederick are enrolled in this program.  Some of these 
volunteers are then trained to staff and run the VMCs in times of crisis.   
Like the preceding two organizations, Volunteer Fairfax in Virginia is 
chartered to train and manage volunteers.  It has the added complexity of 
organizing volunteers across the national capital region, crossing many different 
jurisdictions and covering a diverse set of nationally important areas.  Unlike 
Volunteer Frederick, which is designed around the Medical Reserve Corps, 
Volunteer Fairfax is not specifically aligned with any of the five nationally 
sponsored volunteer programs.  Instead, the organization specializes in 
managing spontaneous, unaffiliated volunteers and processing them for use by 
other agencies in need.55  If, for example, there was a medical emergency,  they 
would assist the Department of Health and Human Services, but Volunteer 
Fairfax would not assume the lead function.   
F. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the United States government has established national 
plans, frameworks, and standards for use during times of crisis.  From the 
National Response Framework and National Incident Management System, to 
the sponsorship of key volunteer organizations under Citizen Corps, the federal 
plan for disaster response is well documented.  Likewise, each of the states has 
developed their own emergency management plans, with additional structures 
and procedures designed to link in with other states, the federal government and 
local jurisdictions.  At the local level, emergency managers and first responders 
work on the front lines; they will be the first to react to any situation.  Mixed in at 
all levels of government are civilian, affiliated volunteer organizations.  They are 
trained to augment emergency services personnel and perform an essential 
 
54 Official at Volunteer Frederick, e-mail correspondence from 13 August 2009. 
55 Official at Volunteer Fairfax, e-mail correspondence from 2 September 2009. 
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function in our society today.  Yet, after major disasters, the vast majority of 
volunteers offering assistance are not trained, not affiliated and simply show up 
wanting to help.  The various systems described above are not designed to 
handle, or integrate these spontaneous volunteers.  Because of this oversight, 
several locales have initiated VRCs and VMCs to harness this valuable human 
capital.   
The next chapter examines the background and controversy associated 
with a national identity card, attempts at credentialing first responders and the 
issues associated with credentialing of volunteers.  
 35
IV. THE DEBATE OVER IDENTITY CARDS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
A. IDENTIFYING THE FIRST RESPONDERS AND VOLUNTEERS 
Firefighters, police officers and paramedics are often associated with 
disasters and can easily be recognized by their unique uniforms and official 
badges.  Other personnel working at disaster sites, such as members of the 
Salvation Army and American Red Cross, may also wear distinctive emblems or 
uniforms for quick identification.  Yet, as discussed in Chapter I, the National 
Incident Management System has a draft plan to require credentialing of all 
personnel working at disaster sites.  This requirement is not limited to 
professional rescuers and members of established disaster relief volunteer 
organizations.  It is intended to cover all personnel, to include converging 
volunteers.  The topic of identity cards and the requirement to carry them is 
controversial.  The following chapter briefly examines some of the reasons 
behind the controversy and provides a brief description of some of the current 
efforts to meet identity and certification requirements across the country. 
B. IDENTITY CARD DEFINED 
At this moment, each of us likely possess multiple forms of identification.  
The format for these documents is varied and can range from government issued 
cards such as drivers licenses and military identification cards, to less official 
documents such as library cards, credit cards, store membership and perhaps 
cards documenting a specific skill.  Yet, any mention of a national identity card in 
the United States brings much debate.  The idea of a single card is not new, but 
is fraught with controversy, fears and conspiracy theories.  An analysis of the 




                                           
discussion on the topic.  Further, an assessment of the arguments in favor of and 
the concerns against such cards clearly shows a division on the subject of 
identity cards.   
Three primary scenarios must also be assessed in order to understand the 
merits and concerns of identity cards: 1.) Federal requirements for all citizens to 
have a card; 2.) Requirements for national identity cards for first responders; and 
3.) Initial attempts at establishing IDs for volunteers. 
Before delving into the history, it is first important to establish a baseline 
definition of what constitutes an identity card and how it is intended to be used.  
Individuals are required to establish identity in order to perform certain functions 
in the world today.  Such activities as crossing international borders, cashing 
checks, entering restricted areas and establishing age all require some form of 
identification.  According to an article in Computers & Security, “One of the most 
widely used schemes for identification is the passport.  They are used by the 
world community to enforce various protocols for travel, work and other 
cooperative ventures.”56  An identity card or passport is designed around the 
premise of establishing the credentials of the person in its possession, thereby 
empowering certain aspects of permission, access or authority.  Of note, 
identification can be acquired and or used fraudulently; this will be addressed 
later.     
The Final Report of the National Commission On Terrorist Attacks Upon 
The United States, hereafter referred to as the 9/11 Commission Report, 
renewed the debate on a national identity card in the United States by 
recommending: 
Secure identification should begin in the United States.  The federal 
government should set standards for the issuance of birth 
certificates and sources of identification, such as drivers licenses.  
Fraud in identification documents is no longer just a problem of 
theft.  At many entry points to vulnerable facilities, including gates 
 
56 George I. Davida and Yvo G. Desmedt, "Passports and Visas Versus IDs," Computers & 
Security, vol 11, no. 3 (May, 1992), 253. 
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for boarding aircraft, sources of identification are the last 
opportunity to ensure that people are who they say they are and to 
check whether they are terrorists.57 
To many people, including members of the American Civil Liberties Union 
and the London-based watchdog group Privacy International, these words were 
the spark that could lead to the creation of a national identity card both in the 
United States and in Great Britain.  Many of these critics argue there are already 
numerous governmental databases containing privacy information for the taking.  
They worry, as John Derbyshire commented in an article in the conservative 
leaning National Review, a national identity card would simply increase the 
efficiency with which the government can track its citizens.   
It is sufficiently disturbing that the federal government can, by 
sorting through a pile of conflicting and unreliable data, track my 
movements and habits with modest accuracy.  That they should be 
able to do this better and more efficiently [with a national identity 
card], it seems to me, a prospect to be dreaded.58 
Similarly, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) created a new Web 
site entitled “realnightmare.com” to extol their views of the problems associated 
with a national identity card.  According to the ACLU cite, “A national ID would be 
part of a system of identity papers, databases, identity checks…that will 
increasingly be used to track an individuals’ movements.”59  Yet, a close 
examination of the facts shows the idea of a national identity card is not new or 
the result of post 9/11 fervor.  Attempts at establishing national identity cards had 
precedents.   
 
57 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean and 
Lee Hamilton, The 911 Commission Report : Final Report of the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Official government ed. (Washington, DC: National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States : For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. 
G.P.O., 2004), 390. 
58 John Derbyshire, “Your Papers, Please,” National Review, Vol. 53, No. 21 (Nov, 2001), 
30. 
59 Discussion of the REAL ID Act as listed on the ACLU created Web site at: 
http://www.realnightmare.org/resources/106, (accessed 9/18/2009). 
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C. HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS 
Citizens of the United Kingdom were required to carry national identity 
cards from 1939-1952.  According to an article in The Political Quarterly, these 
cards were required to ensure men had registered for the draft, for ration card 
purposes, to mail packages and letters and to prove citizenship during World War 
II.60  The cards were eventually abolished as backlash against them could no 
longer be discounted, largely because of the end of the Second World War.  
While there is no current requirement to carry an ID in Britain, many European 
countries do require a card today.  For example, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Spain and Sweden all require a national ID.   
Many Americans might be surprised to know the idea of a national ID 
dates back several decades in our own country, found in many Congressional 
attempts at curbing illegal immigration.  In 1975 the director of the passport office 
in the U.S. Department of State proposed the idea of a national identity card for 
all Americans.61  While this proposal was quickly dropped, additional ideas about 
passing various types of identification laws continued.  In 1981 the chair of the 
Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy supported the idea of 
having a requirement for a national identity card.62  This idea was stillborn as the 
following year, Congress failed to agree on the requirements for even a work 
card, much less a national identity card.  According to Privacy International, a 
global human rights group, a member of President Reagan’s cabinet “proposed a 
tattoo to identify all citizens and the President blurted out, ‘My God, that’s the 
mark of the beast.”63  While this quote may be more urban legend than fact, its 
elevation to folklore demonstrates the sensitivity many Americans have toward 
the notion of an identity card. 
 
60 David Lyon, "British Identity Cards: The Unpalatable Logic of European Membership?" 
The Political Quarterly, vol 62, no. 3 (Jul, 1991), 378. 
61 "Is the U.S.A. Ready for a National ID Card?" Privacy Journal, vol  33, no. 9 (Jul, 2007), 1. 
62 Ibid. 
63 "Is the U.S.A. Ready for a National ID Card?" Privacy Journal, vol  33, no. 9 (Jul, 2007), 1. 
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In 1995 bills were introduced by Senator’s Alan Simpson, Republican-
Wyoming, and Representative Lamar Smith, Republican-Texas, to “create a 
mandatory ID card for all employment applicants.”64  Senator Simpson loudly 
decried the bill as an attempt at instilling a national identity card, but the bill still 
failed to pass.  In 1997, Congressman Bill McCollum, Republican-Florida, tried to 
pass a bill that would have required a photo to be added to the social security 
card, but it was also quickly voted down.65  The dust appeared to settle on the ID 
debate until the attacks of September 2001.   
An October 2001 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center for the 
People and the Press reported, “70 percent of its respondents favored issuing a 
national identity card as one measure for ‘curbing terrorism’; 26 percent opposed 
the idea; four percent had no opinion.”66  It would take three more years to get 
any legislation passed on the ID topic.  In July 2004, the 9/11 Commission 
Report was released.  Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner, Republican-Wisconsin, 
immediately championed and became a staunch advocate of standardizing 
identity cards.  The first attempt at implementing such an idea, using the 9/11 
Report as justification, could be found in the December 2004 Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA).  Section 7212 of the IRTPA contained 
language related to new federal standards for state issued drivers’ licenses and 
identification cards.67  It was the first attempt to standardize, not create a new ID 
card, in the United States.  The act required that a state issued license must 
include the following information: name, date of birth, gender, address of person 
receiving the license, picture, license number and a signature.  This portion of the 
 
64 Will Rodger, "This Time, A National ID Card?" Privacy Journal, vol 27, no. 12 (Oct, 2001), 
6. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Will Rodger, "This Time, A National ID Card?" Privacy Journal, vol 27, no. 12 (Oct, 2001), 
6. 
67 "New Law Furthers De Facto National ID Card," Privacy Journal, vol 31, no. 3 (Jan, 2005), 
1. 
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act was later rescinded, but the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), 
another byproduct of the act, remained in place. 
D. CURRENT IDENTIFICATION LEGISLATION 
According to the U.S. Department of State, the WHTI “requires all 
travelers to present a passport or other document that denotes identity and 
citizenship when entering the United States.”68  The WHTI would later tie into the 
2005 Real ID Act.  Significant to the WHTI was the requirement to use a specific 
type of ID to travel within the Western Hemisphere.  One of the accepted forms 
of ID would be the enhanced state-issued driver’s license.  The enhanced 
portions are those detailed in the 2005 Real ID Act.  WHTI was implemented on 
1 June 2009.   
 House Resolution 1268 is entitled “An Act Making Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and 
Tsunami Relief, for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2005, and for other 
purposes.”  It is more commonly referred to as the GWOT Supplemental for 
2005.  Within the resolution is the 2005 REAL ID Act.  This act is the primary 
legislation fomenting so much debate in the country today.   
According the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, REAL ID “is a 
nationwide effort to improve the integrity and security of state-issued driver’s 
licenses and identification cards, which in turn will help fight terrorism and reduce 
fraud.”69   The Act requires persons born on or after December 1, 1964, to obtain 




68 "Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative," 
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cbpmc/cbpmc_2223.html (accessed 5/15/2009). 
69 Department of Homeland Security discussion on REAL ID available at: 
http://www.dhs.gov/files/laws/gc_1172765386179.shtm (accessed 5/15/2009). 
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have until December 1, 2017.70   While much has been attributed to this act, 
such as the notion that it creates a de facto national id, the act is quite specific as 
to its purpose. 
A REAL ID will be required, according to the Privacy Impact Assessment 
conducted by the Department of Homeland Security, to access federal buildings, 
nuclear power plants, boarding aircraft and traveling under the guidelines of the 
WHTI.71  It is not required for any other purposes.  The Act does require the use 
of standardized formatting and the use of new technology to help ensure the 
security of approved cards.  This act has been the focus of much debate 
surrounding the concept of federalism, and the idea of a national identity card 
and other contentious issues.  The latest guidance from the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security indicates the Act will be enforced starting in 2013, an 
extension from its original 2008 implementation date. 
E. REAL ID CONTROVERSY 
Much of the debate surrounding the REAL ID Act centers on the Tenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  The Amendment states that all powers not 
delegated to the federal government naturally revert to the state.he debate 
centers on the idea of Congress passing a law, in this case the REAL ID Act, 
which the states are then forced to enact and enforce.  In reality, most critics 
suggest the main argument boils down to cost.  States have historically been 
opposed to any ideas from Congress in which they are required to touch state 
coffers for the implementation of federal guidelines.  The states use the Tenth 
Amendment as the basis for this pushback.  As recently as April 2009, Secretary 
of Homeland Security Napolitano, former governor of Arizona, made clear her 
dislike for the REAL ID Act based on cost.   
 
70 Ibid. 
71 Department of Homeland Security Privacy Impact Assessment, available at: 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_realid.pdf (accessed 5/15/2009). 
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The financial requirement to fully implement the Act is immense.  A 2007 
article in The Christian Science Monitor estimated the cost of implementing 
REAL ID would be $14.6 billion dollars.72  Supporters of the Act, such as 
Representative Sensenbrenner, responded that federal funds have been made 
available for states to help offset the cost.  Representative Sensenbrenner’s Web 
site stated, “To date, states have received approximately $130 million from the 
federal government towards REAL ID implementation.  While additional funding 
will be needed to further implement, this program has a positive return on 
investment by eliminating waste and reducing fraud.”73   
There is a large disconnect between the numbers listed by in the Christian 
Science Monitor and those offered by Congressman Sensenbrenner’s office.  
The Department of Homeland Security, the lead federal agency responsible for 
REAL ID’s implementation, states on its Web page that $48.575 million in grants 
were announced in December 2008 to assist states with the security 
requirements portion of implementing the act.  It also stated that between FY06-
FY08 the Department made $361.375 million in grants available to assist the 
states.74  Clearly, the fiscal aspect of REAL ID has implications for states and 
will continue to fuel the debate
A similar complaint from the viewpoint of state sovereignty is the 
requirement to enforce federal laws.  The National Immigration Law Center 
“worries that the law will require state officials to enforce federal immigration 
laws.”75  Adding to that concern, there are currently 11 states that already allow 
illegal immigrants to obtain driver’s licenses if they pass the written test and 
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5/15/2009, 2009). 
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75 Neil Munro, "Whose ID is it Anyway?" National Journal, vol 39, no. 6 (Feb, 2007), 46. 
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demonstrate safe operating procedures.76  These states argue that driver’s 
licenses are for the sole purpose of ensuring safe operation of a vehicle.  They 
are concerned that REAL ID, which prohibits issuing of licenses to illegal 
immigrants, will only increase the dangers of driving a vehicle as illegal 
immigrants will no longer study the laws in order to pass the test.   
Funding and illegal immigrants are only two variables in the hotly debated 
issue revolving around a standardized identity card, the reduction of terrorism is 
another.  According to the U.S. government, as supported by the findings of the 
9/11 Commission, standardized identity cards can greatly curb illegal activities 
and greatly hinder terrorists in the accomplishment of their plans.  How can this 
be accomplished?  The government argues that by linking multiple databases, 
which are currently not aligned, the chances of catching someone dangerous are 
greatly increased.  An article in Business Week helps to clarify this concept.  “At 
least two of the September 11 terrorists were on an Immigration & Naturalization 
Service watch list of suspects, and still they flew around the US, used credit 
cards, had bank accounts, cell phones, and frequent flier memberships, and took 
flying lessons.”77  The logic follows that by picking a very common ID, such as a 
driver’s license, it would be possible to apply the power of modern computers to 
search multiple databases in order to find the lists described in the Business 
Week article.  The state driver’s license appears to be the best option for 
standardization, as it is required for many aspects of day-to-day life in America 
today.  According to the New York Times, “More than 90 percent of American 
adults carry a driver’s license, which now comes in about 200 formats.”78  The 
technical aspects of how REAL ID will standardize these formats will be 
addressed later.   
Some critics, including the American Civil Liberties Union and Privacy 
International, argue that the claim that a central, standardized identity card can 
 
76 "Real ID, Unreal Expectations," Los Angeles Times, Apr 6, 2005. 
77 Paul Magnusson, "Yes, they Certainly Will," Business Week, no. 3756 (Nov, 2001), 90. 
78 Jennifer Lee, "No Secret Identities," New York Times, 134, no. 10 (Feb, 2002), 7. 
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help curb terrorism is anecdotal and largely false.  Marv Johnson, writing for 
Privacy Journal, stated “Although the standardization of driver’s licenses is being 
sold as a way to prevent terrorism, the evidence suggests otherwise.”79  Mr. 
Johnson was referring to a 2004 study conducted by Privacy International 
entitled, “Mistaken Identity; Exploring the Relationship Between National Identity 
Cards & the Prevention of Terrorism.”  The report stated: 
Of the 25 countries that have been most adversely affected by 
terrorism since 1986, eighty per cent have national identity cards, 
one third of which incorporate biometrics.  This research was 
unable to uncover any instance where the presence of an identity 
card system in those countries was seen as a significant deterrent 
to terrorist activity.80 
While the report was interesting, it failed to describe how it defined a 
terrorist act and what constituted a national identity card in the countries 
examined.  To quickly summarize the results, there did not appear to be any 
decline in terrorist activities in countries requiring some form of national identity 
card compared to those without. 
A list was compiled from the report in which the number of attacks was 
reportedly the highest.  The top three countries, as listed in the report, according 
to numbers of attacks from 1986 to 2004 were: #1 Palestine with 240 attacks.  
Palestine does have a national ID program, but no biometric enhancements.  The 
second highest number of attacks occurred in Israel with 227.  It has both a 
national ID program and enhanced biometrics.  The third highest number of 
attacks occurred in Colombia with 90.  Colombia has a national ID, but no 
biometric enhancement requirement.   
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Also culled from the data were the top three countries according to 
numbers of deaths resulting from terrorist attacks since 1986.  The United States, 
with 3650 deaths, had the highest numbers in the report.  The U.S. does not 
have a national ID, nor does it have any biometric enhancements.  The second 
highest casualty rate occurred in Russia with 620.  Russia has both a national ID 
and biometric enhancements.  The third largest casualty country was India with 
520.  It, like the U.S., does not have a national ID program or any enhancements.  
Much more study is required to fully assess the claims made in the Privacy 
International report, but its findings are noteworthy regarding the number of 
terrorist attacks and associated deaths in a country given the presence or lack 
thereof of a national identity program.    
Another related claim countering the notion that identity cards will curb 
terrorism relates to the legitimacy of the cards themselves.  The ACLU has 
countered that any ID is only as good as “the information that establishes identity 
in the first place.”81  The crux of the argument is that false information can be 
provided to government officials in order to obtain legal identity cards, a type of 
identity card laundering.   It would appear the 9/11 Commission would agree.  In 
one of its supplemental reports, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, it states that contrary 
to public misconceptions about the 9/11 hijackers legally entering the country, 
they did not.  “We endeavor to dispel the myth that entry into the United States 
was ‘clean and legal’.  It was not.”82  The report contends that many of the 
hijackers falsified statements or otherwise manipulated information to garner the 
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82 United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration, Border 
Security, and Citizenship and United States, One Hundred Ninth Congress, First Session, March 
14, 2005, Vol. 109-71 (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2005), ix. 
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that inattention to detail, lack of training and sloppy processing by customs 
officials and members of the diplomatic corps helped aid the terrorist in their 
access. 
If would-be terrorists decide to not pursue legal documents, there is a 
booming business in counterfeit identification, which could also meet their needs.  
“One of the biggest holes in the war against terrorism is the easy availability of 
the fake ID.”83  In 2003 the FBI raided a counterfeiting ring in New York City, 
which netted more than 30,000 bogus identity documents.  The fraudulent ID 
trade in America is estimated to be a $1 billion dollar annual business.  According 
to the same Business Week report, each year about 10 million bogus passports, 
Social Security cards, birth certificates, and driver’s licenses are produced.84  
According to law enforcement officials, the problem with fraudulent IDs is that 
there are still more than 240 variants of state IDs and driver’s licenses and over 
7,000 different types of birth certificates.85  Critics of the REAL ID cite such 
statistics as proof that a mandatory card will not significantly hinder terrorists, but 
would deal a crushing blow to the liberty of law abiding citizens.  A quote from 
Missouri State Representative Jim Guest helps to show this concern.  In 
reference to having a national identity card, he stated “I love my freedom, I love 
my country, and we’re heading down a road here that would take away many of 
the things we take for granted.”86  Still, one is left to ponder the implications of 
having so many different types of IDs in the country today.  Perhaps a modicum 
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tenders and voting officials to learn where dates of birth and other vital 
information are stored, located and presented on an ID in a standardized 
manner. 
F. TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES AND CONTROVERSY 
Privacy advocates argue that many of the requirements and advanced 
technologies being mandated for REAL ID can encroach on the privacy of law- 
abiding citizens.  The REAL ID Act does prescribe specific technical features to 
enhance the security aspects of state issued cards, thereby making them harder 
to counterfeit.  These enhancements are controversial.  The U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security has a Privacy Office, which examined the technical aspects 
required under REAL ID and produced a report addressing many of the privacy 
concerns argued by pundits.  The 2007 report details the enhanced security 
features of REAL ID.  It states that a digital photograph is required on all formats 
of ID cards issued by the states.  Critics argue the photo will be used for facial 
recognition technology.  The Privacy Office at DHS confirms this is the reasoning 
for the digital photo requirement.  The photo will be used “to help apprehend 
criminals, and the state DMV will be able to use images and application data to 
prevent drivers whose licenses have been revoked in one state from obtaining 
them in another.”87  This reasoning does not calm critics who claim the 
requirement crosses boundaries into religious reservations against pictures and 
other privacy concerns.  The REAL ID Act contains legal requirements for the 
size, format and quality of the picture, but leaves the storage and processing of 
each up to each state.  Obviously, the issue of digital photography is quite 
contentious.  What is clear is that without a digital photograph, no approved 
REAL ID will be issued.  
Another technical aspect of the REAL ID requires ID cards to have a bar 
code.  More precisely, it details the requirements for the coded area known as 
 
87 Department of Homeland Security Privacy Impact Assessment, available at: 
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the “Machine Readable Technology” region or MRT.  Technically, the DHS lists 
the requirement as a PDF-417 2D bar code.  To simplify, this bar code is the 
same found on most current state-issued driver’s licenses and will include the 
following information, annotated on the graphic at Appendix A: name, address, 
license number, expiration date, date of birth, gender, and the last date any 
modifications were made to the card.  The bar code would also contain any 
additional information deemed appropriate by individual states.  To address 
privacy concerns, the DHS Privacy Department advocated the encryption of all 
data stored in the MRT, but noted there is no federal requirement to do so.88  
Some states, such as California, Nebraska, New Hampshire and Texas already 
have laws protecting the collection of information contained in the 2D bar code, a 
process known as “skimming.”89  It appears the drafters of REAL ID were 
cognizant of state rights and elected to limit regulatory aspects allowing individual 
states to address such issues as skimming. 
Critics have also cited the bar codes and radio frequency chips on identity 
cards for purposes that are more ominous.  As more information is electronically 
stored on cards, on chips or bar codes, the greater the chance of that data being 
stolen.  While traditional bar codes are relatively more secure, as they must be 
physically run through a scanning device to retrieve data, RF chips offer an 
easier choice for stealing information.  Depending on the type of chip used and 
the sophistication of would-be hackers, some RF systems are easily stripped of 
data, while the card remains in the victim’s wallet or purse.90  Erica Naome, 
writing in the January 2009 issue of Technology Review, describes how RF tags 
can be used not only to steal information, but to also track the movement of the 
carrier.91   The technology currently available does make such claims possible 
 
88 Department of Homeland Security Privacy Impact Assessment, available at: 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_realid.pdf (accessed 5/15/2009), 14. 
89 Ibid. 15. 
90 Selwyn Piramuthu, "Protocols for RFID tag/reader authentication," Decision Support 
Systems,  43, no. 3 (April 1, 2007): 897. 
91 Erica Naone, "RFID's Security Problem," Technology Review (Jan, 2009),p. 72-74.   
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according to the Department of Homeland Security and thus its 
recommendations for more encryption. The introduction of biometric 
technologies, such as those made by Senselect Limited of the United Kingdom, 
is designed to protect the data on identity cards, but it can be expensive.92  
G. PHYSICAL ADDRESS REQUIREMENTS 
Prior to the implementation of REAL ID, some states allowed driver 
license applicants to supply a non-resident address, such as a post office box, to 
be listed on the actual card.  Almost half of the states have passed “Address 
Confidentiality Laws” in order to protect specific residents, a fact now in conflict 
with REAL ID.  Other states required a physical address on the application, but 
did not publish it on the final card.  Opponents of REAL ID point out that a 
physical address is required for the new IDs and therefore pose a serious risk 
and invasion of privacy.  They argue if the card becomes the gold standard for 
everyday identity purposes, different people will have access to a person’s home 
address.  This information could be useful for criminals and further the invasion 
of privacy.  If for example, I purchase a new 60 inch flat screen television and all 
the electronic gadgets that go with it, I may not want the cashier at my local store 
knowing where I live, or even worse, the person behind me in line who also sees 
my address as the card is left on the counter during the ring up.  Critics argue the 
requirement of the physical address does nothing but increase the chances of 
someone else doing something devious.  Proponents counter that there are 
provisions in REAL ID for witness protection, domestic abuse victims, etc, and 
that having a physical address makes common sense.  For example, a lost 
driver’s license can be easily returned to its owner if found with a real address.  
Likewise, using the information of a real physical address, an inebriated person 
can be taken home by law enforcement officials or concerned citizens.   
 
92 "Senselect Limited: Biometric innovation breakthrough answers UK ID Card security fears; 
A biometric identity card system that is hacker and thief-proof and puts the missing privacy and 
security into the UK ID project—has been unveiled today," M2 Presswire  (Jun, 2005),p. 1.   
 50
                                           
The Department of Homeland Security, through the Privacy Office, 
addressed the physical address issue and noted while it is impossible to control 
what third parties might do with the knowledge of a physical address, this was 
completely outside of their control.  The DHS report also noted that the REAL ID 
legislation allows for an exemption to the physical address requirement in certain 
cases- “ Those exempted include: victims of domestic violence, judges, protected 
witnesses, law enforcement personnel, sexual assault victims, stalking and 
trafficking victims, domestic violence victims and other exemptions as required by 
the individual state.”93  These caveats, while admirable, still do not satisfy 
staunch critics who decry any requirement for all citizens to list a physical 
address. 
H. IDENTITY THEFT 
One of the biggest criticisms of REAL ID is that it will increase, rather than 
decrease, identity theft in the country.  The concept of integrating multiple 
governmental databases into a single system is ripe with the potential for abuse, 
argues the ACLU and Privacy International.  They cite examples of how 
personnel granted access to search these databases will now be empowered as 
never before to access information that otherwise would not be available to them.  
They argue some workers will disregard the protocols already listed in REAL ID 
and illegally search information for their own reasons.  In a November 2001 
article entitled “Your Papers Please,” John Derbyshire decried the potential for 
such abuses and cited the following example to support his concern- “In August 
1993 the IRS revealed that 369 of its employees in one regional office had been 
investigated for browsing through the returns of friends, relatives, celebrities and 
others.”94  While Derbyshire never clarified how many of the 369 were proven 
 
93 Department of Homeland Security Privacy Impact Assessment, available at: 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_realid.pdf (accessed 5/15/2009). 
94 John Derbyshire, "Your Papers, Please," National Review 53, no. 21 (Nov, 2001), 30. 
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guilty, the example does show how some individuals can abuse their power, 
made all that much easier in the context of REAL ID. 
Another aspect of the identity theft debate revolves around the card’s 
perceived status from credit and law enforcement agencies.  If the card is 
deemed more secure, as the REAL ID legislation hopes, then what becomes of 
those individuals who suffer identity theft after they have received the new card?  
Beth Givens, writing an article for the Privacy Rights.Org commented: 
A lot of what makes it so difficult for victims is that they run up 
against a presumption that the transactions completed in their 
name are legitimate. Banks, merchants, and other creditors 
assume that the purchases that were made and the loans that were 
given belong to the victim – and the victim is forced to prove 
otherwise. Real ID may just strengthen that presumption. If 
someone succeeds in getting a counterfeit Real ID under your 
name, you’ll have to confront a perception that Real IDs are more 
secure and difficult to obtain fraudulently.95 
The argument from Givens is that once credit lenders and banks accept 
REAL ID as more secure, they will automatically assume identify theft will 
decline, thereby concluding those reporting it must be involved in fraudulent 
behavior.   
I. NATIONAL FIRST RESPONDER IDENTITY CARDS 
The tenets of REAL ID are clearly controversial. Yet, with all of the 
controversy surrounding REAL ID, very little attention has been devoted to a 
similar plan, one which would standardize identification for all of America’s first 
responders.  Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) was signed 
by President Bush in 2003.  The plan directs the Secretary of Homeland Security 
to develop a national plan to respond to disasters.  This resulted in the 
development of the National Response Plan (NRP) and the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS).  Under a November 2008 draft plan, DHS 
 
95 "Real ID Act Will Increase Exposure to ID Theft," available at the Privacy Right Web site 
at: http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/real_id_act.htm (accessed 5/17/2009). 
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produced a supplement to the NIMS entitled National Guideline for the 
Credentialing of Personnel.  It “establishes recommended protocols to facilitate 
the coordinated response to incidents and to encourage interoperability among 
Federal, state, and local officials and will facilitate deployment for response, 
recovery and restoration.”96  According to the plan, the purpose of credentialing 
is to verify the identity of the first responder and determine his/her certifications, 
e.g., skills and affiliations.97  This initiative also ties into other federal 
requirements to ensure uniformity and standardization of first responder identity 
cards.   
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 and the Federal Information 
Processing Standard 201 both focus on these areas as well.  This concept is not 
new.  Following analysis of the events transpiring after 9/11, many organizations 
began to examine ways to help first responders integrate faster into disasters 
and quickly identify them and their skill sets.  Two years before the release of the 
draft NIMS Credentialing Plan, a prototype first-responder ID card was 
introduced in the Washington DC area.98  Over 200,000 first responders 
received biometric smart card IDs as part of the program, paid for out of Urban 
Areas Security Initiative (UASI) grant money.  The cost for the initiative was $3.9 
million.99  The standardized card allows responders from multiple precincts and 
jurisdictions to quickly integrate and move from administrative processing to life 
saving operations.  The cards contain digital pictures, medical information, such 
as blood type, and professional certifications.  They are closely related to the 
common access cards currently used by members of the U.S. Armed Forces.  
 
96 National Incident Management System Draft Guidelines for Credentialing of Personnel 
available at: http://www.apcointl.org/pdf/FEMA-NIMS_Credentialing_Guidelines_11-21-08.pdf, 
(accessed 9/18/2009). 
97 Ibid. 
98 Devlin Barrett, "ID would Control Access to Disaster Sites," The Washington Post, Sep 4, 
2007. 
99 "Smart ID Cards to Go to First Responders in Washington—Government Computer 
News," http://gcn.com/articles/2005/08/29/smart-id-cards-to-go-to-first-responders-in-
washington.aspx (accessed 5/17/2009). 
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The same arguments about privacy and cost associated with REAL ID do not 
seem to have crossed the line into the professional first responder arena.  
Perhaps this is due to the limited scope of the program, first responders only, or 
because they are viewed as a necessary tool for their job.  The controversy of 
identity cards and disasters begins to get much more heated and murky when it 
is extended to volunteers. 
J. IDENTITY CARDS FOR VOLUNTEERS 
Credentials for volunteers are needed because, as previously noted in 
Chapter II, they are usually the first to arrive at disaster locations and most of 
them are not traditionally trained emergency first responders.  This was indeed 
the case on September 11, 2001, and during the weeks and months afterwards.  
In the hours and days after 9/11 so many volunteers showed up that temporary 
volunteer check-in sites simply ran out of materials to make cards.  An article in 
the Washington Post described the problems of volunteer identification at ground 
zero in New York and the innovative ways volunteers found to solve them.  After 
police had cordoned off the area, only approved personnel were allowed to enter.  
Volunteers lacking cards simply improvised, “A couple of times I showed my 
Marine tattoo, and they said go ahead…We didn’t forge anything, we just made 
them up with our own pictures, and at one point we copied a UPC code off a 
Pepsi can and they were as good as gold.”100  
A U.S. Department of Labor Report on volunteering in the year after 9/11 
showed “About 59 million people did volunteer work at some point from 
September 2001 to September 2002.”101  The trend is clear, more and more 
citizens are volunteering.  Yet, our ability to track and accurately assign these 
volunteers to jobs commensurate with their skills is lacking.    
 
100 Devlin Barrett, "ID would Control Access to Disaster Sites," The Washington Post, Sep 4, 
2007. 
101 “Volunteering in the United States,” as discussed on the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Web site at: http://www.bls.gov/news.release/History/volun_12182002.txt (accessed 5/17/2009). 
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K. THE VOLUNTEER PARADOX 
While clearly establishing the need for a card for volunteers, the examples 
of both Oklahoma City and 9/11 seem to have been ignored by federal and state 
officials.  Even the NIMS credentialing plan from 2008 balks at requiring 
volunteers or volunteer organizations to standardize.  Section 4 of the NIMS 
Guideline addresses both.  In addressing voluntary, charitable, and not-for-profit 
organizations, to include faith-based organizations, it merely “encourages 
organizations to seek the assistance of the respective State, tribal, and local 
governments to ensure consistency and compliance with the Guideline.”102  It 
offers a list of eight ways volunteers and their organizations can meet the 
requirements under NIMS and better integrate into governmental plans.  These 
recommendations include requests to ensure proof of identity and certifications 
are standardized; using technology to enable interoperability with FIPS 201 
standards and maintain rosters and databases of credentialed personnel.103  It 
does, however, take the bold step of recommending that any volunteers who 
arrive at disaster sites who have not met the Guidelines be “turned away.”    
The requirements for anyone to access a disaster site, as reported in the 
NIMS Guidelines, are threefold.  First, all personnel must provide proof of 
identity.  For volunteers this is an especially tough requirement as many 
organizations, such as the American Red Cross and the Civil Air Patrol, do not 
currently provide volunteer identity cards.  They do provide certification cards, but 
these lack photographs and simply contain a name and a skill set.  Second, all 
persons must establish their specific qualifications or affiliation.  This is the 
easiest for volunteers to provide, as they often have certification cards, proof of 
training certificates and other forms of credentialing.  Finally, a valid 
 
102 National Incident Management System Draft Guidelines for Credentialing of Personnel 
available at: http://www.apcointl.org/pdf/FEMA-NIMS_Credentialing_Guidelines_11-21-08.pdf, 
(accessed 9/18/2009). 
103 National Incident Management System Draft Guidelines for Credentialing of Personnel 
available at: http://www.apcointl.org/pdf/FEMA-NIMS_Credentialing_Guidelines_11-21-08.pdf, 
(accessed 9/18/2009). 
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“authorization for deployment” letter or note must be presented.  This is perhaps 
the hardest requirement for volunteers to meet.  Unlike the military, which issues 
written orders to report to specific locales, most volunteers lack this 
justification.104  Once all three requirements have been satisfied, the volunteer or 
first responder would be allowed to access the area.  Establishing identity for 
volunteers is essential, not only for the aforementioned example of entering a 
crime scene, but also for accountability. 
Aside from the possibility of death, volunteers also face other types of 
dangers.  In a speech to Congress in 2006, then Senator Hillary Clinton 
discussed the dangerous toxins first responders and volunteers faced as they 
“were exposed to the toxic stew at the World Trade Center site.”105  The 
American Journal of Psychiatry conducted a study of workers at the World Trade 
Center site and found “that 12.4% of workers probably had PTSD, an anxiety 
disorder caused by traumatic events such as war, terrorism or assault.”106  
Another study conducted in 2006 by the Journal of the National Institute of 
Environmental Health Sciences reported “The workers who labored at ground 
zero show that the impact on their health has been more widespread and 
persistent than previously thought, and is likely to linger far into the future.”107  
Congress has enacted legislation to expand workers compensation benefits to 
volunteers at the World Trade Center site, but there is no standardized database 
or format to identify all of the workers seeking claims or to reach those who have 
not yet filed.   
 
104 National Incident Management System Draft Guidelines for Credentialing of Personnel 
available at: http://www.apcointl.org/pdf/FEMA-NIMS_Credentialing_Guidelines_11-21-08.pdf, 
(9/18/2009). 
105 "Sen. Clinton Calls on Senate, Fema to Address Medical, Mental Health Needs of 
Volunteers, Workers, First Responders of 9/11," US Fed News Service, Including US State News 
(7/28/2006). 
106 "The Nation; Study Sees Lingering Effects of 9/11," Los Angeles Times, Aug 30, 2007. 
107 Anthony DePalma and Diane Cardwell, "Illness Persisting in 9/11 Workers, Big Study 
Finds," New York Times (Sep, 2006). 
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L. COMMERCIAL SOLUTIONS 
In the absence of any standardized national identity card for volunteers, 
several companies have answered the call to help by producing cards for a fee.  
The International Volunteer Card (IVC) retails for $15.00.  The basic card does 
not have a photo option, but does offer an upgraded card for an annual cost of 
$45.00, which includes a photo.  The IVC is reported to be “available to all 
volunteers and employees of volunteer and non-profit organizations.”108  Another 
commercially available option is the VolunteerIDcard, which costs $25.00 for a 
basic card or $29.95 for a card with a color photo option.  This card is part of the 
International Student Exchange Identity Card and is available for the same 
purposes as the IVC.  It is unknown how these cards, or others like them, will be 
received at volunteer mobilization centers or if they will be accepted as one or 
perhaps two of the mandatory three components as listed under the NIMS 
Credentialing Guidelines.   
M. CONCLUSION 
The fact that most adults in the United States probably have several forms 
of identification on their person at any given time is a testament to the problem 
associated with identification and standardization.  Regulatory attempts at 
credentialing everyone face sharp criticisms as they inevitably cross into privacy 
rights domains.  Concerns over identity theft, cost and impingement on state’s 
rights are only a few of the many debates surrounding identity cards.  REAL ID 
has been enacted by Congress to help standardize identity cards across the 
nation and perhaps to curb illegal activity and fight terrorism.  At the same time, 
the Department of Homeland Security, through the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, has established the NIMS Credentialing Guidelines for a 
national first responder card.  These are initial steps leading to an unknown 
 
108 "IVC Volunteer Card—for Volunteers, by Volunteers,” on the Volunteer Card Web site at: 
http://www.volunteercard.com/ (accessed 5/17/2009). 
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destination, but both are grounded in an attempt to improve certain aspects of 
identity and certification requirements of day-to-day life.   
The issue of identity cards for volunteers is also laced with tripwires for 
debate.  While mentioned in the NIMS Credentialing Guideline as a “good idea,” 
there is still no standardized identity card for volunteers across the country.  
Lessons learned from Oklahoma City and 9/11 have demonstrated the need for 
pre-issued, standardized identity cards for all personnel, but to date, nothing has 
been adopted as a benchmark.  Private industry has attempted to bridge the gap 
by providing volunteer cards for purchase, enticing customers with discounts and 
tax deduction options, but no standardized solution has yet been found.  As we 
learn more about the dangers associated with volunteering at disaster sites, the 
ways terrorist obtain identity documents and how first responders process into 
and out of emergency scenarios, we clearly need some form of certification and 
identity card.  A national volunteer certification card, combined with a REAL ID 
compliant identification card is one way to begin the standardization process.   
The next chapter closely examines the lessons learned from the bombing 
of the Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City, the events of 9/11 and the 
tragedy of Hurricane Katrina to apply the suggestions of a national volunteer 
database and national volunteer ID card. 
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V. VOLUNTEER CARD AND DATABASE THESIS 
APPLIED TO CASE STUDIES 
A. CASE STUDY OVERVIEW 
In order to assess the merits of this thesis’s assertion of the need for a 
national volunteer certification card and database, lessons learned from the 
bombing of the Murrah Federal building in Oklahoma City, the events of 9/11, 
and Hurricane Katrina are examined.  If any of the documented lessons were 
applicable to and potentially mitigated by the recommendations of this thesis, 
they were included in the following sections, linked to each specific case study.   
Before looking at each case, it is important to first describe how the idea of 
a national volunteer database and certification card would be implemented and 
therefore best used to solve the problems detailed in the various lessons learned.  
The concept of the national volunteer database is that it will link citizen skills to 
one of the designated ESF areas as listed in the NRF.  Each ESF lead agency 
would be responsible for determining which skills were relevant to receive 
certification in each specific ESF.  The lead agency would also determine how 
that skill would be properly documented.  It could determine successful 
completion of a training course or a professional licensure to be adequate for 
certification and assign that level of training a specific code.  For example, 
assume that a person has just completed American Red Cross Standard First 
Aid and CPR.  ESF #5 is designated as the lead area for health and medical.  
Therefore the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services could decide that 
successful completion of the Red Cross course would result in an ESF code of 8 
(for the medical category) and then assigned a sub-code to delineate the specific 
skill, such as “a” or “b.”  Once the standards are approved by the ESF lead 
agency, they would be coded and entered into the national volunteer database to 
allow certifying agencies to update the training for each individual.  The online 
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database would also allow individual citizens to self-register and to print their own 
resulting certification cards whenever they wanted. 
To show how this process would work, two hypothetical scenarios will 
show how the ideas put forward in this thesis would be executed in the event of a 
crisis or national emergency. 
Scenario #1—The time is 8:47 AM and the rain has not relented in 48 
hours.  The water pouring out of the Sierra Nevada Mountains is now starting to 
overwhelm protective dams and flooding has been forecasted for parts of 
Sacramento, California.  This is the situation the terrorists have been waiting for.  
They quickly head to their assigned targets, six sites selected for the biggest 
impact, along the fragile levies protecting California’s capital city.  At the 
predetermined time, muffled explosions can be heard through the torrential 
downpour. Although two of the six charges failed to explode, the flooding caused 
by the remaining four quickly saturates the city.  Within 45 minutes, Interstate 5 is 
submerged under four feet of water.  As time continues, the situation becomes 
worse by fleeing residents, all congregating on any passable roadway.  Traffic 
jams snarl all access to the city and basic utilities are knocked out. Hospitals are 
completely overwhelmed. As EMS personnel try to triage the city, large masses 
of civilian volunteers have started to form and prepare for battle. Governor 
Schwarzenegger, calling for calm, quickly rattles off the following request via an 
improvised press conference simulcast over emergency FM, AM, and HAM radio 
frequencies, “We need volunteers with code “8a” and “GV” at the following 
locations… .” The clock has started. It will be at least 72 hours before any 
noticeable help arrives from the federal government. End Scenario #1. 
While some citizens are only moved to volunteer in times of great need, 
such as 9/11 or a massive natural disaster and have therefore, not received any 
prior training or certification, which would make them relevant to a specific ESF, 
there is still a valid reason for having a standard volunteer database.  Volunteers 
could use the database to pre-register at home, before arriving at the disaster 
site.  This would greatly increase the in-processing and efficiency of volunteer 
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management at the VRCs and VMCs. The national volunteer database, 
advocated herein, would also have a catchall designator for those types of 
volunteers.  Designated in scenario #1 as “GV” or general volunteers. These 
personnel can be used for volunteer work not requiring specialized skills, such as 
manual labor. The database still provides these volunteers with a standardized 
card, which allows for the same advantages in terms of accountability and 
processing.  
Scenario #2. —A child has been reported missing in the hills near Golden, 
Colorado. Authorities have requested volunteers to help comb the woods to 
quickly find the child. A local Sheriff is running the overall search coordination 
and has mandated 100% accountability for all volunteers entering and leaving 
the search area. After all, he does not want more people getting lost in the 
process. Using the national volunteer card, a single volunteer can be tasked to 
take a scanner, attached to a laptop, and scan all volunteer cards as the search 
teams leave the rally area. (The technological aspects of the card that allow this 
will be discussed later)  Very quickly, using the national certification card, all 
searchers can be accounted for. Upon returning from the search, all searches 
are subsequently re-scanned again, resulting in the desired accountability. If 
someone was missing, they would be immediately identified by name and 
perhaps have a cell number loaded in the database. In this example, a volunteer 
with no specific certification skills was still easily tracked. The tracking is for 
accountability and safety purposes only. Without such as system, volunteers 
arriving to help search would have to be processed by time consuming means. 
End Scenario #2. 
A national volunteer card, tied to a national database and linked to 
national certification standards will significantly increase America’s response to 
future incidents by allowing proactive volunteer management.  It will also 




state response systems, such as the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS), the Incident Command System (ICS) and the National Response 
Framework (NRF).  
The national volunteer database would only be used for volunteer 
purposes. It would not contain privacy act information such as social security 
numbers or medical information, such as blood type. It will also not have a photo. 
It would not be not designed or intended to be a national identification card or 
part of the Real ID program, with all of the associated controversy already 
detailed in Chapter III. Likewise, the database would not to be used for law 
enforcement or other tracking mechanisms.  To ensure the database was not 
accessed by anyone other than specific emergency management lead agencies 
and volunteer organizations, a private watchdog group could be authorized to 
oversee the privacy aspects of the database. 
The database and subsequent certification card would simply reflect the 
skills and certifications of individual citizens on a voluntary basis. To ensure 
privacy concerns are addressed, the database would randomly create a 
volunteer number, similar to a membership number, for every individual. The 
database would have an option for emergency contact data, e-mail and home 
mailing address, but these sections would also be voluntary. Finally, the 
database would also create a bar code that mirrors the volunteer number for use 
in tracking volunteers at disaster sites and for serving as a proxy for roll calls and 
accountability purposes.  Its sole purpose is to increase the speed of 
administrative processing and ensuring accountability.  
As previously discussed in Chapter IV, there are 15 national emergency 
response functions, which could be used as a foundation for creating emergency 
codes for volunteers and their certifications, as shown in the scenarios above.  
Organizing all of these codes into a single database and printed onto a single 
volunteer card are the goals advocated in this thesis.  A sample national 
volunteer card is shown in Figure 4. 





9g‐ Civil Air Patrol Search & Rescue Team  (ground)                     Expires 9/3/10
5a‐ FEMA courses: IS‐700,800                                                           Expires N/A
GV‐ General Volunteer                                                                        Expires N/A
 
Figure 2.   Sample Volunteer Certification Card 
With the concept of a national volunteer database and certification card firmly 
grasped, it is now possible to look at the three case studies of Oklahoma City, 
9/11 and Hurricane Katrina.  
B. 1995 BOMBING OF THE MURRAH FEDERAL BUILDING 
On Wednesday, April 19, 1995, the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in 
downtown Oklahoma City was bombed. One-hundred sixty-eight people were 
killed in the explosion, with an additional rescue worker being killed while trying 
to rescue a trapped victim.109  In the aftermath of the attack, volunteers 
converged onto the blast sight and joined relief organizations across the city.   
According to Dr. Betty Pfefferbaum of the University of Oklahoma, over 
12,000 volunteers responded to the bombing.110  Some of these volunteers were 
spontaneous, others answered calls for assistance from authorities.   
 
                                            
109 “A Look at the Numbers,” Oklahoma City National Memorial and Museum Web site at: 
http://www.oklahomacitynationalmemorial.org/secondary.php?section=5&catid=145, (accessed 
9/20/2009).   
110 Betty Pfefferbaum, The Oklahoma City Bombing: Organizing the Mental Health 
Response, University of Oklahoma Health Services Center (1996).  
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When officials at the blast site requested rain gear and wheelbarrows, the 
public response was overwhelming.  A three-block line of cars bringing items to 
the drop-off point brought traffic to a standstill and congested essential routes for 
emergency workers.111  Even worse, the growing piles of donated supplies then 
required additional work to inventory, move and eventually store.  Consider this 
explanation from Larson and Metzger: 
A major logistical problem was managing supplies.  While agencies 
had little difficulty obtaining the equipment needed for the rescue 
effort, they faced oversupply rather than shortage, and they had 
difficulty locating and tracking supplies once they arrived.  
Commercial tractor-trailers donated for storage overflowed with 
everything from football helmets to search and rescue gear.112 
This example shows how the actions of average citizens, wanting to help 
volunteer, created additional work for officials working at the blast site.  
It is tempting to assume that disasters require only the efforts of first 
responders. The truth is that assistance from all sectors of the population are 
required to mitigate damage and suffering.  In a survey of volunteers who 
claimed to have helped in some manner following the bombing, five types of 
volunteer activities dominated the efforts of the respondents.   
According to Craig St. John and Jesse Fuchs, both from the University of 
Oklahoma, the most common types of volunteer work resulting from the attack 
were: 1.) giving blood, 2.) giving money, 3.) donating professional goods and 
services, 4.) donating non-professional goods and services, and 5.) volunteering 
time or services to organizations helping with the relief effort.113  The first two 
 
111  Craig St. John and Jesse Fuchs, “The Heartland Responds to Terror: Volunteering After 
the Bombing of the Murrah Federal Building,” Social Sciences Quarterly, vol. 83, no. 2 (Jun, 
2002), 397.  
112 Richard C. Larson, Michael D. Metzger, and Michael F. Cahn, "Responding to 
Emergencies: Lessons Learned and the Need for Analysis." Interfaces, vol. 36, no. 6 (Nov/Dec, 
2006) 488.  
113 Craig St. John and Jesse Fuchs, “The Heartland Responds to Terror: Volunteering After 
the Bombing of the Murrah Federal Building,” Social Sciences Quarterly, vol. 83, no. 2 (Jun, 
2002), 400. 
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activities would not have benefited from the existence of a national volunteer 
database or certification card.  The remaining three activities, however, would 
certainly have been able to take advantage of the benefits of a single database 
and skill-level certification system as advocated.  Professional working men and 
women volunteered in the aftermath of the bombing, in their specific area of 
expertise, but still in a convergence style that could have been better managed 
through a single system.  Two examples help to demonstrate this concept.   
In the Oklahoma City bombing, members of the Restaurant Association 
and the Association of Insurance Agents assisted in providing relief.  The 
problem is that there was no mechanism to streamline these efforts.  As a result, 
ad hoc responses were initiated by well-intentioned professionals, but not aligned 
with government plans and services. 
On the morning of the Oklahoma City blast, across town the Oklahoma 
Restaurant Association “was preparing for its 2nd of 3 days of the annual 
Midsouthwest Foodservice Exposition.”114  According to Cheryl Walker writing in 
Communications World, the 430 exhibitors and 11,000 guests at the conference 
stopped the agenda and began helping with the relief efforts once the bombing 
became public knowledge.  She reported that within the first 48-hours of the blast 
the conference attendees had prepared, “more than 20,000 boxed meals and 
delivered [them] to the site.”115  This type of outpouring is best managed through 
an ESF type structure with emphasis on logistics and food safety.  It also shows 
how a professional organization can use professional skills to help in times of 
need.  This example shows a spontaneous, unaffiliated volunteer response, 
already organized under the professional umbrella of the Restaurant Association. 
The Oklahoma Association of Insurance Agents was also active 
immediately following the blast.  According to an article in Rough Notes, a 
 
114  Cheryl Walker, “Are You Prepared for the Worst?,” Communications World, vol. 12, no. 
6 (Jun/Jul 1995).  
115 Cheryl Walker, “Are You Prepared for the Worst?,” Communications World, vol. 12, no. 6 
(Jun/Jul 1995). 
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magazine for the insurance industry, appraisers were well aware that they could 
not help “the dead or the dying,” but they could begin to help with the recovery 
from an insurance perspective.116  Within three hours of the blast, insurance 
agents were hard at work.  When agents arrived in the area of the blast they 
immediately noticed between 600-700 automobiles that had sustained 
damage.117  Not only did they proceed with paperwork, but they tried to help in 
whatever capacity they could.  Many were overwhelmed by the destruction and 
“began helping their clients minimize the damage by putting up plywood over 
shattered windows.”118  These efforts were not part of any organized response 
to the bombing, but could have been combined with official recovery efforts to 
create synergistic effects.  One potential medium to increase this coordination 
could have been the ESF annex codes, organized and employed via a national 
volunteer database and certification card structure.   
Examination of the facts of the Oklahoma City blast show the problems 
associated with volunteer convergence.  Using a counterfactual analysis, would 
the existence and use of a national volunteer database and certification card 
have helped to mitigate some of these problems?  Clearly, there are many 
aspects to consider when organizing the volunteer response to a disaster 
situation.  As the previous examples of the Restaurant Association and the 
Insurance Agents have shown, it is not only average citizens who must be 
planned for, but also organized groups.  As the Oklahoma City example has 
shown, professional, well-intentioned groups will also try to assist and must 
therefore be managed in some manner.  A national system of volunteer 
management, linked to ESFs begins to provide some structure to meet this 
challenge. Likewise, the logistical problems associated with donated goods might 
have been mitigated by the assistance of trained volunteers, organized 
 
116 Phil Zinkewicz, “Oklahoma Agents and Companies Respond Quickly to Bomb Disaster,” 
Rough Notes, vol. 138, no. 6 (Jun, 1995).  
117 Ibid. 
118  Phil Zinkewicz, “Oklahoma Agents and Companies Respond Quickly to Bomb Disaster,” 
Rough Notes, vol. 138, no. 6 (Jun, 1995). 
 67
                                           
specifically for such eventualities.  Had there been a formal request for 
volunteers skilled in warehousing, forklift operations, commercial truck drivers 
and those with data entry skills, the supply gridlock could have been better 
managed and potentially mitigated.   
While there is no way of predicting the amount of volunteers or donated 
resources that will arrive at a disaster location, proper forecasting and planning 
can help to mitigate some of the resulting waste.  Assuming a national volunteer 
card was in existence before this attack, there would be an identified pool of 
skilled workers capable of dealing with the massive influx of donated items.  
These volunteers could have been requested by using ESF code #7 (logistics 
management and resource support) and prepositioned prior to official requests 
for aid from the public.   
While a national volunteer card and database are not a panacea for all of 
the problems associated with volunteer convergence, they are tools that could 
help to organize average citizens into areas where they already have skills. 
C. SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, TERRORIST ATTACKS 
“On September 11, 2001, nineteen Al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked four 
commercial aircraft, intending to strike the World trade Center and various 
targets in Washington, D.C..”119  When the attacks were over, nearly 3,000 
people had been killed.120  In the resulting outpouring of support, more than 
30,000 volunteers helped in some form or fashion.121  Unfortunately, there were 
 
119 “9/11 Timeline,” as detailed on the National September 11 Memorial and Museum Web 
site at: http://www.national911memorial.org/site/PageServer?pagename=new_history_timeline, 
(accessed 9/20/2009). 
120 Ibid. 
121 Michael W. Brand, Dave Kerby, Brenda Elledge, Tracey Burton, Dana Coles, and Amy 
Dunn.  “Public health's response: citizens' thoughts on volunteering,” Disaster Prevention and 
Management, vol. 17, no. 1, (Jan, 2008):54.  
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few “official outlets for citizens to participate in recovery.”122  Had there been a 
mechanism such as the ESF coded database, volunteers could have been 
requested for specific skill sets and quickly vectored to the appropriate area for 
work.   
As previously noted in Chapter IV, at ground zero the authorities 
eventually established a perimeter to secure the area.  For a time, identification 
badges were made on the spot and distributed to volunteers until supplies ran 
out.  Then volunteers “were given stickers to wear on their clothing to identify 
them as volunteers.  This was prompted by several occurrences of unscrupulous 
individuals mixing in among the volunteers and then stealing supplies.”123  It is 
clear from this case study that a better system is needed for credentialing and 
identifying personnel working in areas associated with a disaster.  Yet, even 
today, volunteer mobilization and reception centers are planning on issuing or 
creating identification cards for volunteers once they arrive at the site.  There is a 
better and more efficient solution. 
A national volunteer card, tied to a national database of skills would allow 
citizens to print their own cards at home or work and arrive with them already 
prepared.  This would increase the speed and accuracy of those processing 
through VMCs and VRCs.  The United States is a very technically adapt and 
“wired” nation and could access this type of system with relative ease.  Kalpana 
Shankar at Indiana University recently detailed how communities have been 




122 William R. Voorhees, “New Yorkers Respond to the World Trade Center Attack: An 
Anatomy of an Emergent Volunteer Organization, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management, vol. 16, no. 1 (Mar, 2008),3.  
123 William R. Voorhees, “New Yorkers Respond to the World Trade Center Attack: An 
Anatomy of an Emergent Volunteer Organization, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management, vol. 16, no. 1 (Mar, 2008),6. 
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emergency situations.124  This technology can be used as a force multiplier to 
better manage the volunteer response to disasters by empowering average 
citizens. 
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the population of the United States 
was 307, 481,352 as of 18 September 2009.125  Of those, 220 million had 
access to the internet.126  Therefore, with over 71% of the entire U.S. population 
having access to the internet, it is possible that a Web-accessible national 
volunteer database and volunteer card capability could solve the problem of 
volunteer identification as highlighted in the September 11 case by empowering 
citizens to print their own cards.    
D. 2005 HURRICANE KATRINA 
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall in southern 
Louisiana with winds in excess of 125 mpg.127  “Katrina wreaked staggering 
physical destruction along its path, flooded the historic city of New Orleans, 
ultimately killed over 1,300 people, and became the most destructive natural 
disaster in American history.”128  As the storm abated, nearly 60,000 volunteers 
swarmed to help.129  Many Americans witnessed the devastation from Katrina 
and headed across the country to help.  
 
124 Kalpana Shankar, “Wind, Water, and Wi-Fi:New Trends in Community Informatics and 
Disaster Management,” The Information Society, vol. 24 (Mar, 2007), 116-120.  
125 U.S. demographic data as listed on the Census Bureau Web site at: 
http://www.factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html?_lang=eng, (accessed 9/18/2009).  
126 “Internet World Statistics for North America,” as listed on the Internet World Web site at: 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats14.htm, (accessed 9/18/2009).  
127 Hurricane Katrina facts as report on the U.S. National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 
Administration Web site at: http://www.katrina.noaa.gov/,(accessed 9/22/2009).  
128 United States, Executive Office of the President and United States, Assistant to the 
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, The Federal Response to Hurricane 
Katrina : Lessons Learned. Washington, D.C.: White House, 2006, 1. 
129 United States, Executive Office of the President and United States, Assistant to the 
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, The Federal Response to Hurricane 
Katrina : Lessons Learned. Washington, D.C.: White House, 2006, 49. 
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According to published accounts, many of these volunteers came from 
organized groups, such as religious organizations and civic improvement clubs. 
During the cleanup for Katrina, “Nine thousand Southern Baptists from 41 states 
volunteered 120,000 days during which they served 10 million meals and pushed 
forward cleanup and recovery efforts.”130  Americans even volunteered to help 
rescue Katrina’s four legged victims. “As soon as the images of desperate 
animals started flooding TV screens and the Web, thousands of volunteers 
flocked to a temporary shelter in Gonzales, Louisiana, 60 miles west of New 
Orleans.”131 Unfortunately, as was experienced in the previous case studies, 
these efforts often created chaos and waste. 
For example, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, one mental health 
volunteer reported: 
I noticed large piles of clothes at major intersections, a tennis court, 
and even at a car wash. After the hurricane, people organized 
clothing drives. When the clothing arrived, we were unable to find 
anyone to take them, so we unloaded them in an area for people to 
take them.132  
The worker proceeded to clarify that much of the donated clothing was 
inappropriate for the situation, such as winter coats, gloves and scarves.133  The 
intentions of all involved although noble, were largely wasted as their was no 
standardized structure for managing the donated resources or the skills of the 
volunteers.   
Every pair of hands and every set of eyes can be useful at the site of a 
collapsed building, conducting house searches or even unloading truckloads of 
aid equipment. Yet, these hands and eyes need to be accounted for and 
 
130 Marvin Olasky, "Responding to Disaster," Vital Speeches of the Day 72, no. 25 (Nov, 
2006), 744. 
131 Kerrin Winter Churchill, "The Kindness of Strangers," AKC Gazette 122, no. 12 (Dec, 
2005), 31. 
132 Alise G. Bartley, "Confronting the Realities of Volunteering for a National Disaster," 
Journal of Mental Health Counseling, vol 29, no. 1 (Jan, 2007), 8. 
133 Alise G. Bartley, "Confronting the Realities of Volunteering for a National Disaster," 
Journal of Mental Health Counseling, vol 29, no. 1 (Jan, 2007), 8. 
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assigned jobs commensurate with their training. Without the requisite training, 
many volunteers cannot be used. One Veterinary surgeon commented on the 
need for volunteer training before arriving at the scene during a recent interview 
regarding Hurricane Katrina: 
Being on the emergency response side of it for as long as I have, 
it’s very frustrating when well-meaning people come out of the 
woodwork to help, but you have no criteria or idea what their 
availability or capabilities are in a disaster.134 
A national certification card could greatly increase the correct pairing of workers 
with the skills needed to solve this type of situation.   
In 2005, then Senator Barrack Obama introduced legislation to create the 
Hurricane Katrina Emergency Workforce Act. His goal was to “Create a national 
emergency health professional volunteer corps to ensure there is a ready pool of 
volunteer doctors and nurses who are willing, trained and certified to serve in 
times of disaster.”135   While his goal was admirable, it is only a small start. The 
larger solution lies with the empowerment of the masses. We need to prepare as 
many citizens as possible, as early as possible for use in disasters. In times of 
crisis, we need all manners of volunteers. In New Orleans, for example, during 
the recovery phase of Hurricane Katrina, there was a need for sanitation workers, 
construction workers, plumbers, electricians, child care providers, and many 
others. A national volunteer database accomplishes this goal. It would not only 
serve as the central repository for volunteers to self-register, but would also 
serve as a “virtual” switchboard, allowing standardized certification of specific 
skill sets.  
 
134 David Frabotta, "Planning to Volunteer," DVM, Vol 37, no. 8 (Aug, 2006), 28. 
135 "Sen. Obama Introduces Bill to Create National Emergency Volunteer Corps," US Fed 




The lessons learned from Oklahoma City, 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina all 
point to the need for a standardized, national approach at managing volunteers.  
The outpouring of support and donated supplies in these cases resulted in waste 
and distracted relief efforts.  While we may never be able to forecast how many 
people will turn-out to help following the next disaster, we can begin to shift our 
management paradigm from a reactive posture to a proactive plan.  Creating a 
national volunteer database aligned with the emergency support function annex 
codes as prescribed under the NRF is a first step in realizing this new vision.  
Once a baseline standard has been established, individual citizens can then be 
empowered to self-register, print their own cards and arrive at mobilization 
centers ready to work.  Their cards will allow for more rapid processing, better 




Volunteer convergence after disasters is a well-documented phenomenon.  
As the examples of the Oklahoma City bombing, 9/11 attacks, and Hurricane 
Katrina have shown, disasters can be the catalyst for large-scale volunteering, 
but the convergence of large numbers of uncoordinated, un-registered volunteers 
has also been shown to create new problems that can make it difficult for first 
responders to do their jobs and for volunteer help to be utilized effectively.  Yet, 
even today, the lessons of volunteer convergence from these events have still 
not resulted in new and proactive mechanisms for their resolution.  To put it 
bluntly, if another disaster occurs in the United States, there is still no 
standardized plan to deal with all of the expected outpouring of supplies and 
offers of assistance that Americans are known for.   
Lacking a standardized solution for volunteer convergence, many states 
have developed their own responses to address convergence.  The state of 
Florida, as already discussed in Chapter III, has designed a state-wide volunteer 
management structure, aligned with state-derived emergency support function 
codes.  It has been widely used to help mitigate the devastation caused by 
hurricanes and tropical storms for years.  It relies on volunteer reception centers 
to organize and assign average citizens to relief efforts.  Likewise, Frederick 
County in Maryland has developed its own volunteer check-in sites, currently 
dispersed at five church buildings to screen and mobilize volunteers as they rush 
to disaster sites to help.  The locations of these buildings are advertised 
throughout the local area and used in training exercises.  Volunteer Fairfax, in 
Fairfax county Virginia, also relies on volunteer check-in centers, but has elected 
not to advertise their locations.  According to officials at Fairfax, these locations 
are not made public to allow time for appropriate staff to arrive and set-up before 
the expected throngs of citizens inundate them.  These three examples show 
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how various states have recognized the problem of convergence and taken 
similar and different approaches to solving it.    
These efforts, while well intentioned, are only a partial solution to the 
bigger question of proper volunteer management, accountability and utilization 
during times of great need. 
B. UNDERSTANDING THE REQUIREMENTS OF DISASTERS 
While it is intuitive that first responders such as fire fighters, police officers 
and paramedics are needed in disasters, less intuitive is the need for hundreds to 
thousands of workers with other skill sets.  Long after the fire trucks have 
returned to the station house, other workers are still hard at work in the hardest 
hit areas.  Plumbers, electricians, engineers, sanitation workers, construction 
workers, childcare providers, mental health professionals, insurance adjusters 
and a myriad of others are also needed at disaster sites.  While some of these 
workers are paid, many volunteer their skills free of charge.  Yet, current efforts 
of volunteer convergence management are not equipped to differentiate these 
different skill sets.  Volunteer centers established at disaster sites either forward 
volunteers to other organizations or try to quickly categorize their skills for 
general use.  While the logic of this processing is sound, the overall construct is 
inefficient.  Time is wasted when volunteers are funneled into centers where they 
are forced to fill out forms, while staffers attempt to match them with skills and 
requests from other agencies.  A more efficient and proactive approach is 
needed. 
As discussed in Chapter III, volunteer organization and official first 
responder agencies are active at disaster sites.  Depending upon the disaster 
and its severity, the needs of these organizations will vary.  When the resources 
of these agencies are exceeded, they may ask for volunteer assistance.  
Currently, there is no standardized mechanism for requesting such 
augmentation.  For example, the Salvation Army may need cooks to help 
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augment one of its mobile food vans at a disaster site.  A main issue to solve 
regarding this need is how to request assistance?  Depending on the local 
structure, the Salvation Army may simply ask for unskilled workers in the 
immediate area to help.  Likewise, it could fill out a volunteer request sheet 
documenting the desired skills needed and forward that request to a volunteer 
reception center.  Depending on the urgency of the call, perhaps the volunteer 
center can wait for the correct person to “arrive” at the center check-in and be 
assigned to the Salvation Army at that time.  This example shows how reactive 
the management of volunteers is at a disaster site.  While food preparation is a 
relatively benign example, consider one with more implications that are ethical. 
During disasters there is an acute need for medical personnel and those 
who can care for children, the sick and the elderly.  Ideally, volunteers helping in 
these areas would already be certified and have the appropriate background 
checks to work there.  Yet, there is no national system to ensure that unskilled, or 
worse, criminals, are not inadvertently assigned to work in such cases.  This 
example shows how important it is to have a proactive plan for requesting, 
processing and assigning appropriate volunteers to specific jobs. 
C. NATIONAL VOLUNTEER DATABASE RECOMMENDATION 
Proactive management of volunteers before the next disaster occurs 
requires a national volunteer database. Aligned with the fifteen emergency 
support function codes (ESF) already defined in the National Response 
Framework (NRF), this database could empower millions of Americans by pre-
registering them and documenting the skills they already posses. The state of 
Florida has a similar system, with its own state derived ESF codes, but a national 
system is needed.  As advocated in this thesis, a national volunteer database 
would allow average citizens to document their skills for use in a disaster in one 
standardized and easily accessible manner.  By structuring the database within 
the framework of the NRF, a coherent and streamlined national approach can be 
initiated for addressing volunteer convergence.  
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Before examining  four specific recommendations regarding the creation 
of a national volunteer database and its ability to produce a standardized 
volunteer certification card, a few caveats must be addressed.   
First, if implemented it must be understood that this proposal is not a 
panacea for all of the chaos and complexities associated with a disaster.  Trained 
emergency management personnel and volunteer centers are still required to 
ensure the proper utilization of converging volunteers.  The database and 
accompanying certification card are merely tools designed to aid those 
professionals already working in disaster management. 
Second, it is important to note that any voluntary system will always some 
individuals electing not to participate.  In that regard, even with a national system 
in place, there is a strong chance that large numbers of people will still arrive at 
volunteer centers without the standardized cards.  In this case, the solution will 
be to process them in the same manner they are currently being processed (i.e., 
standing in line, filling out forms and interviewing with volunteer center staff 
personnel).  Volunteer managers should plan for and anticipate such an outcome 
and develop “express” lines for those volunteers possessing the appropriate 
certification cards.   
Third, in order to ensure the maximum number of citizens are proactively 
prepared for the next disaster, a cohesive public service announcement 
campaign should be initiated, tied to current preparedness programs, urging all 
Americans to register in the database and to print the generic “GV” card as 
described in the previous chapter.  
Fourth, the debate over what constitutes an approved form of national 
identity is still unresolved.  The advocated volunteer certification card will still 
require the accompaniment of a state recognized form of legal identification.  
This format is currently left to the state.  State driver’s licenses, military identity 
cards or passports could all be acceptable formats.  The benefits of the 
certification cards are that they allow volunteers to have a single format for 
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documenting skills and ensuring accountability.  It is possible to sidestep the 
national identity debate with this card, while still ensuring proper certification of 
skill sets and meeting accountability requirements.   
Fifth, the implementation of such as system will be complex and 
expensive.  Some entity will be required to develop and maintain the national 
database infrastructure, software, and training aspects.  Likewise, the linking of 
volunteer skill sets with the appropriate ESF annex will require significant work 
on the part of each ESF lead agency.   
These caveats must be considered and planned for when implementing 
and maintaining the database recommended herein.        
RECOMMENDATION #1—Establish a national volunteer database, tied to 
the ESF codes as listed in the National Response Framework.  
A national volunteer database allows government officials and emergency 
response coordinators to accurately request and track specific volunteer skill 
sets.  Instead of waiting for volunteers to arrive at reception or mobilization 
centers, tailored requests for specific skill sets, tied to the ESF structure can be 
made via radio, Web site or megaphone broadcasts.  As discussed in chapters 
IV and V, the technical aspects of the database and resulting volunteer 
certification card will allow for organizers to not only request specific skill sets, 
but to also monitor when those requirements have been filled.  The possibilities 
for proactive volunteer management with a national database are immense.  
Consider the following example. 
A chlorine gas leak has sickened dozens to perhaps hundreds of residents 
near a chemical plant.  A large decontamination site has been established on the 
perimeter of the affected area and volunteers are needed to help clean the 
victims and do other tasks.  Two potential solutions to this problem will be 
detailed below, one using a generic system, similar to those in use today and the 
other using the national volunteer database. 
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Given the scenario above, many locales would simply request volunteer 
assistance at the decontamination site using the media or other forms of 
broadcasting.  Depending on the level of the request, volunteers with various skill 
levels would descend on the site.  They would then be dispersed to assist without 
proper knowledge, documentation, or accountability for their safety.    
Conversely, using the national volunteer database, an emergency official 
could quickly query the system for registered users with experience dealing with 
hazardous materials.  If the system indicated no registered users with such skills, 
an alternative plan would be devised, perhaps similar to the general broadcast 
scenario mentioned above.  If, on the other hand, 50 volunteers in the local area 
have hazardous material skills, the officials could request these volunteers by 
ESF code. The use of ESF codes does not advertise the exact requirement.  This 
allows the proper volunteer personnel to respond while preventing well-
intentioned citizens from rushing to the area.  Once onsite, these volunteers will 
be an asset because of their specific needed skill sets, and furthermore can 
easily be accounted for as a safety precaution.   
The ESF coded system can be used for multiple requests and ties directly 
into the volunteer mobilization and volunteer reception center structures.  As 
officials request specific codes, these centers could quickly scan the bar codes of 
these volunteers certification cards and know how many volunteers per code 
have been processed.   Once the requisite numbers per code have been met, 
volunteer center staffs could then report back to officials and the public.  To 
realize the benefits of a national volunteer database, it must be populated.         
RECOMMENDATION #2—Initiate and continue nation-wide public service 
announcements for citizens to pre-register with the national volunteer database 
and print their own certification cards before a disaster. 
Average citizens have unique skill sets and certifications that can be used 
at disaster sites.  These skills are already acquired, but not documented in any 
standardized fashion.  A national volunteer database would allow any citizen to 
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pre-register at any time in the database.  The database would empower citizens 
to print their own certification cards and carry them on their person before any 
real crisis occurs.   
RECOMMENDATION #3—Assign a lead federal agency to develop, 
administer and maintain the national volunteer database. 
A database of this size and magnitude would require significant resources 
to develop and maintain.  It would also require a staff to coordinate the pairing of 
ESF specific codes to ESF lead agencies, as discussed in chapter III.  While any 
number of organizations could be created to accomplish this task, the U.S. 
Selective Service System already has a mission similar to that of a national 
volunteer database and would be ideally suited for such a role.  As the Selective 
Service System has already developed a web-enabled registration system for the 
Uniformed Military Services, it is ideally suited for this task.  
RECOMMENDATION #4—Integrate a national volunteer database and its 
use into national emergency training scenarios and the National Response 
Framework and National Incident Management System as needed. 
A national volunteer database should be fully integrated in the national 
emergency response structures as detailed in this thesis.  By adding specific 
reference to the database in federal guidelines and scenarios, its credibility is 
enhanced and the likelihood of its intended use is increased.    
D. CONCLUSION 
The American people are gracious and respond to disasters with 
overwhelming forms of support.  From donating funds and goods, to volunteering 
their time and services, Americans have and will continue to converge on 
disaster sites.  As history has shown, these citizens are often mismanaged or 
neglected.  While some states and locales have developed their own responses 
to alleviate the convergence problem, a national approach is needed.  Volunteers 
routinely cross state lines and may not be aware of locally developed volunteer 
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structures.  A national volunteer database, tied to the structure and standards of 
the Emergency Support Function Annex of the National Response Framework 
can help to streamline volunteer management when our country needs it most.  
APPENDIX A 
Hypothetical driver’s license showing the data contained in the MRT. Constructed 









The following lists each National VOAD member organizations and the types of 
services provided during emergencies and disasters. This is not a guarantee of 
services nor does it list every possible service provided. Much is dependent upon 








Active in Disaster 
 Facilitates and encourage collaboration, communication, 
cooperation, and coordination, and builds relationships among 
members while groups plan and prepare for emergencies and 
disaster incidents. 
 Assists in communicating to the government and the public the 
services provided by its national member organizations. 
 Facilitates information sharing during planning, and 
preparedness, response, and recovery after a disaster incident. 
 Provides members with information pertaining to the severity of 
the disaster, needs identified, and actions of volunteers 





 Distributes relief items such as: drinking water, groceries, 
clothing and more. 
 Provides warehousing & other donation coordination services such 
as Points of Distribution centers (PODs). 
 Operates volunteer centers where community members can 
volunteer during disaster response. 




 Provides cleanup, repair and initial rebuilding.  Short-term 
volunteers work cooperatively with Church World Service. 
 Provides financial assistance to victims during both the relief & 
recovery stages. 







 Operators setup and run organized communication networks 
locally for governmental and emergency officials, as well as non-
commercial communication for private citizens affected by the 
disaster. They activate after disasters damage regular lines of 
                                            
136 “Members.” National Voluntary Organizations Active In Disaster.  
http://www.nvoad.org/Members/NationalMembers/AboutOurMembers/tabid/93/Default.aspx. 




communications due to power outages and destruction of 
telephone, cellular and other infrastructure-dependent systems. 
 ARRL volunteers act as communications volunteers with local 
public safety organizations. In addition, in some disasters, radio 
frequencies are not coordinated among relief officials and 
Amateur Radio operators step in to coordinate communication 
when radio towers and other elements in the communication 
infrastructure are damaged. 
 At the local level, Hams may participate in local emergency 




 Provides Mass Care operations such as: shelter, fixed and mobile 
feeding services for disaster victims and emergency workers in 
the affected area, and the distribution of supplies and 
commodities.  
 Provides emergency and preventive health services to people 
affected by disaster. 
 Provides individual assistance at service delivery sites and 
through outreach, by referral to government and/or voluntary 
agencies through distribution or financial assistance. 
 Provides services leading to reunification of family members in 
the affected area. 
 Performs damage assessments. 






 Provides food and clothing, shelters, counseling; it also renders 





 Provides emotional and spiritual care 




 Engages a network of volunteers to repair or rebuild homes for 
disaster survivors who lack sufficient resources to hire paid labor, 
focusing on vulnerable communities. 
 Trained, skilled project leaders supervise volunteers. 
 BDM cooperates with the local disaster recovery organization to 
enhance the long-term recovery of the community.   
 Provides Maryland-based warehousing & distribution services 
through the Church of the Brethren’s Material Resources center. 
 Children’s Disaster Services (CDS) alleviates disaster-related 
anxiety in children through specially trained and certified 
volunteers. 
 Provides children a safe, secure and comforting environment in 
shelters and assistance centers. 
 Offers specialized care for children experiencing grief and trauma. 




 Provides assistance including direct financial assistance to 
communities in addressing the crisis and recovery needs of local 
families. 
 Performs initial damage assessments. 
 Provides ongoing and long-term recovery services for individuals 
and families, including temporary & permanent housing 
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assistance for low income families, counseling programs for 
children and the elderly, and special counseling for disaster relief 
workers. 







 Fully equipped & trained Rapid Response teams for clean up, 
chain saw & mucking out 
 Trained volunteer managers assist local community in the 
formation and operation of long term recovery organizations. 
 Provides community wide Unmet needs assessments for long 
term recovery organizations 
 Provide construction estimating services using skilled volunteers 
 Provide accounting services for long term recovery and VOAD 
organizations using volunteer CPAs 
 Provide skilled teams for long term housing repair and 
construction. 
 Chaplaincy services 






 Emotional and Spiritual Care for survivors, responders and care-
givers. 
 POD volunteers and management 
 Clean-up 
 Direct services to individuals – un-met needs 
 Volunteer coordination 
 On-site needs assessment and help 
 Volunteer assistance to other organizations – shelter 
management, other needs 
Church World 
Service 
 Provides advocacy services for survivors.  
 Provides case management for low income & marginalized 
groups.  
 Provides emotional and spiritual care as well as physical 
rebuilding programs.  
 Assists in long-term recovery of those in need.  




 Supports first responders during rescue phase. 
 Provides food, water & shelter during the relief phase. 
 Provides emotional & spiritual care and case management to 
assess the needs of victims. 
 Is committed to the effort of rebuilding homes and communities. 
Convoy of Hope  Facilitates relief efforts between churches and other organizations 
to help best serve the needs of survivors.  With our fleet of 
trucks, 300,000 square foot warehouse, Mobile Command 
Center, and utilizing the first response P.O.D. (Points of 
Distribution) model, USDR has become an active and efficient 
disaster relief organization, providing resources and help to 
victims in the first days of a disaster.  
 




medical assistance, and financial aid within the first 90 days 
following a disaster.  
 Provides on-going recovery activities through rehabilitation 
grants, which offer the means to rebuild, replant ruined crops, 
and counsel those in trauma. 
 Delivers relief kits and other emergency supplies and food to 
emergency shelters & camps. 
 Works primarily through Church World Service in providing its 
disaster-related services. 
 Does rebuilding for individual homes damaged during disasters. 
 Helps residents restore the social and economic fabric of their 
communities by providing economic and educational 
opportunities and improving access to legal services and home 
ownership. 
 Trains & equip local denominations to prepare for and respond to 
disasters that devastate their communities. 
 
Feeding America  Collects, transports, warehouses, and distributes donated food 
and grocery products for other agencies involved in both feeding 
operations and distribution of relief supplies through its national 
network of food banks. 
 Processes food products collected in food drives by communities 
wishing to help another disaster-affected community. 
 Develops, certifies, and supports their food banks. 
 Positions frequently used emergency food products and personal 
care items in strategic locations and regularly cycles inventories 
to ensure usage by survivors immediately following a disaster 
 Serves as a liaison between the food banks and the donors. 
 Educates the public about the problems and solutions of hunger. 
 Specializes in disaster training for its network, and continually 
improves standard operating procedures that enable member 
food banks to develop seamless, coordinated approaches to 
delivering disaster assistance.  
Feed the Children  Provides help to survivors of natural disasters occurring in the 
United States and around the world. 
 Provides food, water, blankets, cleaning supplies or other relief 
supplies to individuals and families affected. 
 Through a subsidiary, picks up in-kind contributions from 
corporate warehouses and individual donors, to any of its six 
regional distribution centers for either bulk distribution or directly 
to individual relief boxes for families. 
Foundation of 
Hope – ACTS 
World Relief 
ACTS is striving to be a NIMS (National Incident Management 
System) Compliant disaster response agency, able to respond 
within 24 hours of federally declared incidents, using its volunteer 
army of everyone. We have been most active in the Gulf Coast, 
which is FEMA Region IV; but are now expanding our 
organization nationwide and internationally. We are proud of the 
services that we currently provide utilizing our fleet of trucks, 
forklifts, heavy equipment, refrigeration trailers, tents and support 
equipment for:  
 87
o Establishing Points of Distribution to rapidly and 
efficiently distribute goods within six hours of their 
arrival by common carrier. 
o Cooking and distributing hot meals with self-
contained mobile disaster kitchens of various sizes and 
capacities. 
o Staging area or Base camp management at the request 
of State or Local Emergency Operation Centers. 
o Mobile Public Address Systems (mobile sound 
stages). 
o Debris removal and personal item recovery teams. 
o Registration and coordination of unaffiliated 
volunteers within the impacted area. Using mobile 
volunteer registration centers we are able to organize 
and form work teams to provide workforce resources 




 Conducts community housing assessments for long-term 
recovery. 
 Works with partner families to build or rehabilitate simple, 
decent, and affordable homes after a disaster. 
 Offers construction and development technical assistance to 
communities. 
 Facilitates community involvement and support during the long-
term recovery process. 
 Introduces alternative construction technologies (modular, 
panelized/SIP housing, etc) to communities to speed up the 





 Supports disaster survivors by assisting with budgeting and 
developing financial recovery plans: 
o Pre-disaster preparedness seminars 
o Emergency budget counseling 
o Emergency Credit Management 
o Assistance with working with creditors 
o Referrals to government and private agencies 
o Assistance with obtaining copies of destroyed financial 
documents 




 Changes lives by harnessing the compassion and commitment of 
dedicated staff and volunteers to deliver sustainable, high-impact, 
community-based services to the poor and needy 
 Partner with the American Red Cross to help prevent, prepare 
and respond to emergencies 
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 Utilizing a large international volunteer base 
 Establishing centers on all six inhabited continents that are rooted 
in the community 
 Creating networks of people, organizations and governments that 
work together 
Humane Society 
of the United 
States 
 
Provides assistance with animal rescue, handling and transport in a 
timely and humane way: 
 Assessment of animal related needs. 
 Establishment & management of temporary emergency animal 
shelters. 
 Evacuation support. 
 Veterinary evaluation of animals. 
 Relocation and support of disaster affected animal facilities. 
 Transition of support to local resources during the recovery 
phase. 
 Donations & volunteer management including emergent 
volunteers. 
 Serves as resource for individuals, animal-related organizations, 
and others concerned about the urgent needs of animals before, 







Emotional and Spiritual Care: 
 Pre & post-incident training. 
 Risk & Crisis Communication. 
 Crisis planning & intervention with communities& 
organizations. 




 Distributes food and critical relief supplies. 
 Helps communities develop effective social services through 
collaborative efforts to improve roads, renovate schools, rebuild 
utilities: water and sewage systems, and establish health 
facilities. 
 Collaborates with other organizations to provide shelter and 
necessary tools such as financial counseling to disaster victims. 








 Provides response efforts through a pre-selected group of 
Lutheran social service agencies with established standing in the 
affected communities. 
 Provides spiritual and emotional counseling for affected persons 
 Helps in coordinating volunteer teams for cleaning-up and 
rebuilding disaster affected homes. 
 Provides case management services for long-term recovery 
 Provides training and expertise on volunteer coordination, case 
management, long-term recovery, construction, and database 
management. 
 
Mennonite  Assists disaster victims by providing volunteer personnel to clean 




personal property.  
 Repairs or rebuilds under-insured primary residence homeowners 
with emphasis on assisting with the special needs of the 






Services of the Homeland Security Emergency Air Transportation 
System (HSEATS): 
 Transport into disaster response areas of small high-priority non-
hazardous cargo (including blood) up to 300-400 pounds (boxed) 
when commercial ground or air not available. 
 Aerial reconnaissance of disaster area. 
 Air transport of disaster response personnel and evacuees 
into/from/within disaster area when commercial ground or air not 
available. 
  Relocation of special populations including special "surge 
services" using commercial air ambulance services (by pre-
arranged MOU only) 
  Coordination of available corporate jet aircraft for disaster 
response in cooperation with NBAA. 
  Management of large-scale airline provided relocation 







Provides spiritual crisis counseling, short term pastoral care and long 
term pastoral counseling through its board certified chaplains and 
professionally trained chaplains.   
 Provides education and training in disaster spiritual care. 
 Helps organize volunteer disaster chaplains, through its 
association with American Red Cross' Critical Response Team 
and other professional chaplaincy organizations, who wish to 
provide immediate disaster spiritual care services in the 
aftermath of disasters. 
National Baptist 
Convention USA 
 To lessen the impact of disasters and potential catastrophic 
incidents by meeting the needs of communities through 
preparedness and mitigation 
 Provides the following services: 
o Mass care 
o Emergency assistance and casework 
o Emotional and/or spiritual care 
o Supporting services to state and local VOAD member 
agencies 
o Recovery 
o Donations Management 
o Volunteer Management 





 Provides coordinated emergency services with federal, state and 
local government agencies and non-profit agencies. 
 Transports food and other disaster goods through trailer units. 
 Provides communication services through trailers equipped with, 
e.g., ham radios and scanners. 
 Provides direct financial aid to victims. 




 Provides social and mental health services for individuals and 




psychological first aid, crisis intervention, crime victim resources, 




 Provides clean-up and rebuilding assistance, especially to the 
elderly, persons with disabilities, the widowed, and those least 
able to help themselves. 
 Works in the recovery phase by assisting with the emotional 
needs of disaster victims. 
Noah’s Wish The mission of Noah’s Wish is to save animals during disasters by 
providing: 
 Rapid deployment of disaster response teams 
 Operation of temporary animal shelters 
 Rescue and evacuation assistance 
 Veterinary care for disaster related injuries or illness 
 Short and long term foster care for animals 
 Permanent placement for all unclaimed or surrendered 
animals 
 Coordination and distribution of donated supplies and food 
Operation 
Blessing 
 Transports food and emergency supplies to disaster survivors. 
 Assists in disaster medical relief. 
 Provides direct financial assistance to victims. 
 
Points of Light 
Institute/Hands 
On Network 
 Creates innovative, actionable models for citizen-centered 
problem solving, and direct, tangible tools and opportunities for 
people and organizations to apply their interests and passions to 
make a difference. 
 Serves 83% of the American population and 12 international 
communities in nine countries through hundreds of affiliates — 
places where people can get connected, get involved and make 
change happen in their communities.  
 Focus on helping people plug into volunteer opportunities in their 
local community, helping non-profits manage volunteer resources 





 Works primarily through Church World Service in providing 
volunteers to serve as disaster consultants.   
 Funding for local recovery projects that meet certain guidelines. 
 Provides trained volunteers who participate in the Cooperative 
Disaster Child Care program. 
 Provide volunteer labor and material assistance at the local level. 
 Supports volunteer base camps for volunteer groups assisting 
with the rebuilding efforts. 
REACT 
International 
 Provides emergency communication facilities for other agencies 





 Provides emergency assistance including mass and mobile 
feeding, temporary shelter, counseling, missing person services, 
medical assistance. 
  Provides warehousing services including the distribution of 
donated goods including food, clothing, and household items. 
 Provides referrals to government and private agencies for special 
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services.   
 Does individual & family counseling. 
 Recruits, trains, house, and transports volunteers. 
 Coordinates economic reconstruction efforts. 
 Provides financial assistance to victims through case 
management to include: housing needs, disaster related medical 
& funeral expenses. 
 Emotional & Spiritual care. 
Samaritan’s 
Purse 
 Emotional and Spiritual Care. 
 Provides cleanup assistance.  
 Emergency home repairs. 
 
Save the Children  Provides disaster relief services for children in shelters including 
food, clothing, diapers, evacuation backpacks. 
 Also provides supervision in designated areas within shelters. 
 
Society of St. 
Vincent De Paul 
 Provides social services to individuals and families, and collects 
and distributes donated goods.  
 Makes store merchandise available to disaster victims. Operates 
retail stores, homeless shelters, and feeding facilities that are 
similar to those run by the Salvation Army.  
 Provides warehousing facilities for storing and sorting donated 
merchandise during the emergency period.  
 





 Provides mobile feeding units staffed by volunteers who prepare 
and distribute thousands of meals a day. 
 Provide disaster childcare – mobile units transport equipment and 
supplies to a facility where trained workers provide safe and 
secure care for children. 
 Provide units and trained volunteers to assist with clean-up 
activities, temporary repairs, reconstruction, chaplains, 
command/communication, and bilingual services. 
 Provide water purification, shower and laundry units and trained 
volunteers for disaster responses. 
Tzu Chi 
Foundation 
 Emotional and Spiritual Care. 
 Provides Medical and Financial assistance. 
United Church of 
Christ 
 Coordinators help to organize volunteers for clean-up and 
rebuilding efforts; as well as participate in response and long 







 Organizes direct assistance, such as financial and social services, 
to Jewish and general communities in the U.S. following disaster. 
 Provides rebuilding services to neighborhoods and enters into 





 Raises and distributes funds equitably to the most vulnerable 
populations in affected communities. 
 Provides case management services and related training for the 
long term recovery of victims. 
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 Coordinates shipments of disaster relief supplies and kits, 
including cleanup supplies. 
 Provides spiritual and emotional care to disaster victims and long-
term care of children impacted by disaster.   
 Offers training in support of volunteer activities in disaster 
recovery. 
 
United Way of 
America 
 Provides experience, expertise, and resources to local United 
Ways facing local, regional, state or national emergencies. 
 Gives direct grants to support disaster recovery, such as: home 
repairs, food vouchers, counseling. 
 Acts as a resource & information guide for survivors, through its 





 WHI has worked in 5 national disasters within the last 3 years. 
  As an organization we have the ability to initiate a strong 
volunteer response to our work through the partnership of 1500 
Wesleyan Churches and their membership located within the 
United States.   
 Our volunteers have donated thousands of hours of time and are 
highly skilled.   
 Our leaders coordinate well with churches and pastors in the 
disaster areas to establish distribution sites and housing facilities 
for volunteers. 
 Our volunteers are willing and ready to do clean up, gut houses 
or rebuild homes. 
 WHI also has relief kits and tool resources available for disaster 
response. 
World Vision  Trains and mobilizes community-based volunteers in major 
response and recovery activities. 
 Provides consultant services to local unaffiliated churches and 
Christian charities involved in locally-designed recovery projects. 
 Collects, manages, and organizes community based distribution 













Photo Identification  (ID) Requirements for Individuals Wishing to Register 
and Volunteer Through Volunteer Frederick’s Emergency Volunteer 
Mobilization Center  
 
1. Each individual must have acceptable and valid ID to be interviewed and 
assigned as a volunteer through Frederick County’s Volunteer Mobilization 
Center. ID requirements will be strictly enforced. 
 
 If you arrive at the VM Center without the required identification, 
VMC staff will not register you. 
 When registering, you must use exactly the same name as is shown 
on the primary identification document that you present at the VM 
Center 
 .Only misspellings of your name can be corrected at registration. 
NAME CHANGES WILL NOT BE MADE. 
 
If the Intake staff (Forms Checkers) question the ID you present, 
you will be required to present additional proof of identity. If positive 
confirmation cannot be made you may be refused registration. 
 
2. You must present one (1) of the following primary ID documents: 
 passport with photo and signature 
 driver’s license with photo and signature 
 state ID with photo and signature 
 national identification with photo and signature 
 military identification with photo and signature 
 
Unacceptable Identification Documents 
 any expired ID 
 draft classification card 
 credit card of any kind 
 Social Security card 
 learner’s permit or any temporary identification document 
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